Can South Korea’s declaration of martial law set a new policy precedent for a Trump presidency on the Korean Peninsula?

22 December 2024 - Written by Amirza B. Batubara

Introduction

South Korea’s recent declaration of martial law under President Yoon Suk Yeol, though lasting only six hours, has sparked significant debate about its potential implications for right-wing-led democracies worldwide. Yoon’s unilateral attempt to circumvent parliamentary procedure has raised alarms, particularly in light of ongoing shifts in global power dynamics & America’s impending global retraction. With Trump’s rhetoric already suggesting an openness to further downsizing of America’s foreign military presence from the nation, Yoon’s People Power Party fears a loss of much-needed hedging defences against its neighbour to the North.

Yoon quickly imposed a short-lived martial law that would’ve silenced all dissent from the opposing Democratic Party & their pro-reunification stance. Whilst quickly shut down, this serves as a reminder of just how rash leaders can act in the face of anticipated threats. South Korea’s threat perception, however, is not an isolated case - looking at Europe’s attitude to Russia, one can see how eerily similar these contemporary narratives of adversarial fear are.

Remarkably, this incident took place just weeks away from 2025 - the year that would have concluded the US & South Korea’s joint 5-year Special Measures Agreement (SMA) that legitimates the presence of 28,000+ American troops. With Trump coming into office the same year, chances of a renewal of the agreement thins out as Trump has since 2019, insisted South Korea pay $5 billion more annually, a fivefold increase from the pre-2019 figure of $900 million. With only a 13.9% yearly increase rate agreed for South Korea’s budgetary contributions to the agreement in the end, Trump has since not shied away from repeatedly expressing disdain against South Korea.

A potential martial law could have cushioned the adversities imposed by Trump’s mass divestments. With potential higher expenditures allotted to defence, South Korea will use the same narrative as Trump’s first administration - backtracking democratic norms in the name of national security. Without U.S. support, South Korea faces further erosion of security arrangements with reduced U.S. troop presence, the imposition of financial strain worth at least $1billion as South Korea absorbs SMA costs & increased pressure for independent defence-building - all aspects explored deeper in this paper. This report thus serves as a stern warning of how its divisive geopolitical implications may impose complications on trade &therefore business for investors, scholars, & politicians alike.

A Precedent for Trump?

With geopolitical tensions permeating an increased aura of distrust, the world must remain vigilant with the return of a Trump presidency as he returns with a newfound apparatus of tech-dominated control (e.g.: Starlink, X) under the helm of tech mogul Elon Musk. With South Korea being one of America’s closest allies, Yoon’s hasty policy turn can set a new policy precedent whereby the dismantlement of social liberties is justified under the name of the state, starting with the purging of the “Other” interests before cutting through other policy realms like immigration & trade. Ultimately, Yoon’s blunder reveals a troubling reality: we live in a world where heightened national security concerns increasingly justify the suppression of dissent through emergency measures.

Contextual Analysis

In the aftermath of the Second World War, the world was split into two factions - a democratic West & the imperialist, communist Eastern bloc - in a seemingly perennially tense time of the world known as the Cold War. Pitted against the two were predominantly East & Southeast Asian states, and among them was the Korean Peninsula. What ensued in the decade thereafter was a turbulent war that later became known as the Korean War, bringing pro-Western governance in Korea south of its consequent Demilitarised Zone (DMZ).

For the rest of the Cold War, South Korea became the centre of massive American investments in the region in a bid to keep communist influence away from these so-called “power vacuums”. The former two were especially important due to their high economic potential, with America placing foreign military bases in both countries in anticipation of intimidation from the Soviets & their proxies - a list that included their ally North Korea.

Eventually, the regime of the Cold War came crumbling & the long-feared Soviet government fell apart. But one aspect that remained was the schism between North Korea’s communist regime - which became more isolated - & South Korea’s liberal democratic regime. Perpetuated by a continued presence of American military assets, both sides of the Peninsula have since seen their fair share of skirmishes. However, recent tensions have reached new heights with the rise of conservatism.

Key Players & Stakeholders

South Korea: Ally to the United States and an “enemy” to its neighbour, South Korea is a prominent actor in this polemic. Led by conservative Yoon Suk Yeol, he is under the leading minority People Power Party, with the Democratic Party as their main opposition—itself a party that has previously endorsed pro-reunification policies under its last tenure of power with Moon Jae-in.

United States: Soon to be led by an increasingly bitter President Trump, who with his anticipated start of a second administration, is expected to succeed Joe Biden on January 20, 2025 - only 20 days after the SMA expires.

North Korea: North Korea stands as a “hermit” state unwilling to talk with the two current administrations. It contains a huge arsenal of both manpower (with up to 1,320,000 active personnel, 560,000+ reserves)& weaponry (including at least 50 nuclear warheads).

Economic, Military & Social dimensions

Economic: Figures that indicate increased market volatility are expected should this line of policy be pursued & may become a trend that transcends Trump’s administration given his inclination toward tariffs & budget cuts against foreign trade, especially with China & BRICs countries. One common denominator of the two is extensively using their un-democratic regimes as bargaining chips for compliance - Yoon with his martial law execution, and Trump with his 100% tariff increase threats to BRICS nations who try to de-peg the dollar from their monetary reserves.

Military: Another possibility, albeit nuanced, is an openness to more financing in defence & military budgets - one that Trump is also keen on given his desire to increase defence budgets, albeit for domestic use. With 2024 statistics, the US Defence currently spends about $967 billion on NATO - a budget far cry from its figures with South Korea being at $897 million, yet still falls $109 billion short from Trump’s calls to increase national inputs to 3% per each member states’ GDP to NATO.

Despite being separate entities, they share the same policy frameworks as they are hubs of American regional interests, and therefore similar power dynamics - including a NATO-South Korea Individual Partnership & Cooperation Programme effective since 2012. So while America largely invests in Europe more than South Korea, it is likely that Trump is to bring a more intimidatory front equally between their NATO as well as their East Asian counterparts to ensure these relationships get sustained “fairly”, especially given his transactional view of South Korea, recently termed “transactional diplomacy”. Furthermore, America-led project goes against SK’s bi-partisan interests to cut defence budgets, which with Trump’s increasing disdain for SK’s lack of contribution (again, referring to his transactionality in engagement), might have to be reversed to mitigate a Trump-led departure should it still perceive NK as a threat serious enough to warrant martial law.

Social: Hyper-conservative attitudes may bring disdain to ruling governments & sow further division between host states. As observed with the Capitol riots in 2021 & ongoing protests in favour of Yoon’s impeachment in South Korea, a reprisal of social tensions is more likely under both administrations & may persist if either leader does not start listening to public demands. It is worth mentioning that public attitudes against the leaders personally are also similar - having a record of being called for impeachment & imprisonment. Nonetheless, it is worth noting that President Yoon was impeached 10 days later by the National Assembly, through a vote against him for his misconduct. Had Yoon wanted to keep his post, the tides could have been reversed if positive public outlooks on North Korea could have been maintained under his watch - a trend that often follows tracks from peacemaking rhetoric.

Opportunities & Risks

Opportunities:

• Chance to explore nascent, less tangible sectors such as digital & cyber.

  • Research on these fields will be rudimentary to national security, just as much as it is for tech development & innovation.

  • The UN is still curating a global framework on cybersecurity, which presents new opportunities to retain defence stability amidst retracting norms.

• Alternative investment & policy liberalisation opportunities for nearby developing states like Vietnam, Indonesia, and Malaysia.

Risks:

• Emboldening of Trump’s more hawkish policy for the US, especially in immigration & trade.

  • Universities have already begun advising international students & faculty to return early before his inauguration in anticipation of “setbacks”.

  • More countries may impose their tariffs against America, as China has already set anticipated a 10% hike in the coming months.

• Clampdown of transparency measures in lobbying & investment.

Recommendations - Policy Considerations

Enhancing the defensive capacity through upskilling instead of upscaling:

The current level of South Korea’s defence emphasizes expanding scale instead of skillfulness—the martial law’s precedent itself is the fear of being under capacity. However, further AI and digital training for all personnel instead of a dedicated cyber team away from equipping more deterrent technologies will hone situational or threat awareness and produce more autonomy from relying on their allies.

Conversely, a more fiscally conservative America will be able to save up to at least $1 billion in operations as well (the cost of operating the THAAD when it opened). With a transfer of power, crucial infrastructure such as THAAD can then be operationalised by host country forces independently from the US - a step that can only happen with enough trust, reconnaissance & upskilling instead of upscaling budgets.

Facilitate a trilateral dialogue between the two Koreas & the US:

This policy will guarantee stability in the narrative and peace for the region. Focusing more on “softer” diplomacy may be the missing ingredient to recalibrate conservative regimes and bring about much-needed major adjustments made by all parties involved to make this forum work.

Legislators must guarantee & establish the existence of an All-Party Parliamentary Group to ensure an apparatus exists for foreign policy mediation between willing party members on an informal yet monitored basis. Once channels have re-opened, delegates must deliberate a summit with the regime to re-negotiate terms in military & defence terms, to ensure the Seoul-Pyongyang hotline gets utilised beyond the telephone & worst-case scenarios such as further nuclear build-up are to be mitigated.

Facilitate security-oriented communications in said forum:

To ensure the sustainability of said dialogue, an independent committee or Ombudsman is to be set up to act as a third-party mediator in finding common ground in divisive policy standings, one for each department (e.g., defence, foreign policy) concerned. These meetings should also be held regularly. This will equally contribute to the aforementioned point on forming trilateral rapport.

Another potential pivot is to also utilise the ASEAN +3 forum, which has been designed as a “talk shop” or “discursive platform” to allow East Asian states to discuss grievances and issues—though this requires the unanimous consent of ASEAN member states to allow North Korea as a Strategic Partner.

Uphold defence commitments & security:

Once a sense of dialogue & rapport has been established, reports must be published outlining the defence interests of all three nations, with priority over the annual White Paper findings. This will ultimately lay the roadmap to re-establishing accords with North Korea to reinstate reconciliation policy, ultimately leading to reunification rhetoric by the end of Trump’s presidency, with emphasis on synergising military assets first & UN assistance (as they man the DMZ to date)

Conclusion

South Korea’s brief declaration of martial law may set a new policy precedent for America’s incoming Trump presidency in emboldening the dismantlement of social liberties & democratic norms for the sake of the state. Still, there are ways legislators can act to tackle said mindset. However, Trump’s administration should become cautious as well given the newest developments that involved Yoon’s impeachment and subsequent suspension - a staunch reminder of how true democracy may act should another instance of similar scale to the 2021 riots were to ever reoccur again.

To flank on “soft diplomacy” will already pacify many concerns of military or nuclear build-up - worst-case scenario accounting North Korea’s nuclear weapon arsenal. This paper has signalled legislators & investors to move away from mobilising conventional weapons & beyond, to instead focus the narrative on building one with the adversary, and emphasise defence demands.

This approach will eventually bring a two-pronged benefit - bring back further use to the Seoul-Pyongyang hotline, which 2021 has since remained dormant despite being “active.” The provided recommendations will bring back much-needed communication between both states without the need to destroy each other; a chance to soften intimidation (or ‘gunboat diplomacy’) in foreign policy transactionality, as this paper aims to open new dialogues in overlooked sectors such as the aforementioned AI and digital training cybernetics skills, which will ensure personal-level upskilling, enable further autonomy, and eventually enhance defence commitments simultaneously to armies in fear of foreign defence repercussions from a Trump-led withdrawal.