Written By Tarik Ata

Niger at a Crossroads: Security, Sovereignty, and Alliance Shifts 

14/04/2025 - Written by Anna Braun

Introduction

Niger is at the heart of a rapidly shifting geopolitical landscape in the Sahel. Since the July 2023 military coup, the country has been at a critical juncture, grappling with the consequences of growing insurgency violence, a shifting political and economic landscape, and changing international alliances. The military junta has distanced the country from its former Western partners, expelled their military forces, and strengthened ties with Russia. On January 29, 2025, Niger, alongside its neighbours Mali and Burkina Faso, withdrew from the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), having formed an alternative regional bloc known as the Alliance of Sahel States (AES). These events have marked a significant shift in Niger’s regional and international position, affecting its security, political, and economic trajectory. With General Abdourahamane Tchiani now sworn in as president and the country beginning a ‘flexible’ 5-year transitional plan to democratic rule, Niger’s future will be shaped by its ability to navigate these complex dynamics.

Pre-Coup Security Landscape and Counterterrorism Efforts

The security crisis in Niger reflects the broader instability in the central Sahel, which remains the global epicentre of terrorism, accounting for more than half of the world’s terrorism deaths in 2024. Niger has faced multiple jihadist insurgencies, with Boko Haram and Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP) operating near Lake Chad, while Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM) and Islamic State-affiliated groups such as Islamic State in the Greater Sahara (ISGS) have expanded their presence in the tri-border area with Mali and Burkina Faso. Despite these challenges, Niger was considered a key Western security partner before the 2023 coup and was seen as more effective than its neighbours in containing jihadist expansion.

Niger was an active participant in several regional and international coalitions. It contributed to France’s Operation Barkhane, was a member of the G5 Sahel alongside Mali, Chad, Mauritania, and Burkina Faso, and contributed forces to the Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF) with Nigeria, Chad, Benin, and Cameroon to combat Boko Haram and ISWAP. Additionally, the country hosted a U.S. air base, which was critical for intelligence operations across the region. Unlike Mali and Burkina Faso, which relied heavily on military force, Niger employed a multi-faceted counterterrorism strategy of targeted repression, decapitation, and negotiations. This approach had yielded some success, with terrorist activity in early 2023 reaching its lowest levels since 2018. However, while it was relatively effective in containing insurgencies, it did not eliminate them. Public frustration with ongoing instability and a distrust of foreign military operations contributed to the coup and the shift in security approaches.

Heads of state of Mali, Assimi Goita, Niger, General Abdourahamane Tiani, and Burkina Faso's, Captain Ibrahim Traore at the summit of the Alliance of Sahel States (AES) in Niamey, Niger, July, 2024. Credits: X @GoitaAssimi

Military Coup and Shifting Alliances

The July 2023 military coup, which ousted President Bazoum, followed a series of military takeovers in the central Sahel, particularly in Mali and Burkina Faso. While the junta cited security concerns and poor economic management, central motivations were political infighting and General Tchiani’s fear of losing his position as head of the Presidential Guard. The coup triggered immediate condemnation, particularly from ECOWAS, which threatened military intervention to restore Bazoum. In response, Mali and Burkina Faso supported Niger’s junta, and they signed a mutual defence pact. This growing alignment led to their withdrawal from ECOWAS and the formation of the AES, with a commitment to deepen cooperation, including the establishment of a joint military force to combat jihadist violence in the region. 

Niger’s foreign policy took a significant turn as it distanced itself from Western powers, particularly its former colonial ruler, France. Since independence in 1960, France has maintained a strong economic and military presence, especially in the uranium sector and counterterrorism operations. After Mali expelled French forces in 2022, France relocated most of its troops to Niger, increasing its military footprint. However, anti-French sentiment intensified, fuelled by frustrations over France’s perceived failure to curb terrorist violence and concerns that its presence primarily served its own interest rather than Niger’s. Consequently, the junta ceased military cooperation with France and, later, with the U.S. Niger also withdrew from the G5 Sahel and announced its departure from the MNJTF on March 30, 2025. This marked a decisive shift away from broader regional security coalitions in favour of military cooperation within the AES.

Following regional shifts away from Western influence, Niger began forging new security partnerships, notably with Russia. In April 2024, the Africa Corps, a Russian paramilitary organisation succeeding the Wagner Group, deployed personnel and equipment to Niger to support the junta and provide military assistance. Already active in other Sahel countries like Mali, the Africa Corps positioned itself as the primary security partner for AES states, signalling a critical geopolitical realignment away from the West and toward Russia. 

Counterterrorism Challenges and Strategic Shifts

The security situation in Niger has deteriorated since the coup, with geopolitical shifts and a resulting power vacuum enabling terrorist groups to expand. Terrorism-related deaths increased by 94% in 2024, making Niger the fifth most affected country globally, up from tenth in 2023. Both JNIM and ISGS have increased their activities, launched more attacks, and approached the capital, Niamey. The junta has abandoned Niger’s previous multifaceted counterterrorism strategy in favour of a more aggressive militarised approach. This shift has exacerbated indiscriminate targeting, increasing civilian casualties, but has failed to effectively curb insurgencies. Troops have been repositioned to secure the capital and consolidate power, weakening strategic defences and allowing insurgents to expand. The March 21, 2025, ISGS attack on a mosque, which resulted in the death of 44 civilians, underscores the escalating threat in Niger.

In this context, Africa Corps, Niger’s new security partner, appears to have prioritised regime protection over counterterrorism efforts. Unlike prior international coalitions, and as seen in Mali, Africa Corps lacks the capabilities for sustained operations, and its heavy-handed tactics have been linked to human rights violations and possible war crimes. This raises concerns that similar actions in Niger are likely to exacerbate civilian insecurity and provide jihadists with new recruitment opportunities. Additionally, external pressures like the war in Ukraine and the situation in Syria have strained the resources available to Africa Corps, highlighting the stark contrast with the more substantial support offered by previous coalitions and the limitations of relying on Africa Corps for success in Niger.

The AES partnership, which aims to deploy a joint force of 5,000 troops for regional counterinsurgency operations,  presents an opportunity to address security challenges in the tri-border area, potentially bridging gaps in Niger’s counterterrorism efforts. However, its effectiveness remains untested and uncertain without the logistical and financial support of previous coalitions. Meanwhile, Niger’s withdrawal from the MNJTF risks creating security gaps in the Lake Chad region, putting additional strain on military resources. Indeed, tensions with Nigeria have further weakened cross-border security efforts, enabling new groups like Lakuwara to exploit the lack of an integrated response and launch attacks on both territories. The fracturing of regional alliances has already harmed Niger’s security landscape, and renewed partnerships will be crucial to address these challenges.

Resource Nationalism and Economic Realignments

Niger’s economic realignment reflects its broader political and military shifts, signalling a commitment to reducing foreign influence and asserting control over the country's natural resources. Resource nationalism has been a central theme of Niger’s economic strategy, particularly concerning its uranium and oil reserves. Having one of the world’s largest uranium deposits, the junta made a significant move to assert control by revoking the operating license of French nuclear company Oran at one of the largest uranium mines. Similarly, in March 2025, Niger expelled Chinese oil sector officials, citing disparities between local and expatriate salaries. These actions show the junta's broader aim to limit foreign dominance. However, such moves risk straining relationships with key international partners, which remain crucial to Niger’s economic growth. 

In response to its shift away from Western powers, Niger has increasingly turned to Russia and China for support. Russia’s involvement is likely to extend beyond military aid, with reports suggesting the potential acquisition of some of Orano’s assets and uranium mining permits. China, already a significant player in Niger’s oil sector, continues to invest in vital projects such as the Agadem oil fields and the Niger-Benin pipeline. These partnerships mark a clear departure from Niger’s traditional Western economic ties, highlighting the growing influence of non-Western powers in the region. 

Despite the junta’s efforts toward greater economic sovereignty, economic growth and stability in Niger will not come without challenges. Indeed, political instability and security threats are likely to hinder the effective management of its natural wealth, further exacerbating the country’s fragile situation. At the same time, the sanctions imposed by ECOWAS and other powers following the coup severely impacted Niger's population. As one of the world’s poorest countries, already grappling with a humanitarian crisis, these international sanctions exacerbated humanitarian needs, including food insecurity, poverty levels, and access to public services. Coupled with the security crisis and cuts to foreign aid, which previously accounted for nearly half of its annual budget, Niger risks further deepening its humanitarian crisis and instability. These challenges are substantial, and without effectively managing security, political stability, humanitarian conditions, and renegotiating foreign investments and aid, Niger’s path to economic progress is likely to remain strained.

Key Players and Stakeholders

  • Niger’s Military Junta 

    • In power since July 2023, the junta has distanced Niger from Western powers, forged new military alliances with Mali, Burkina Faso, and Russia, and shifted its counterterrorism approach. It has also prioritised reasserting control and sovereignty over the country’s natural resources.

  • Alliance of Sahel States (AES)

    • Formed after withdrawing from ECOWAS, the AES aims to strengthen military and economic cooperation between Niger, Mali, and Burkina Faso, with a focus on regional security and countering the insurgency threat. 

  • Jihadist Groups 

    • The primary security threat in Niger, these groups have escalated violence, capitalising on the post-coup power vacuum and military realignment, posing a significant challenge to regional stability.

  • ECOWAS and Regional States

    • These states are concerned by Niger’s shift, as it threatens regional cohesion, democracy, and signals the gradual reduction of Western influence within the Sahel, also risks of escalating insecurity across the Sahel.

  • International Powers

    • Russia emerges as Niger’s main security partner through Africa Corps, with growing influence over both military and economic sectors.

    • China is a key economic partner, particularly in the oil sector, and is likely to capitalise on the withdrawal of Western powers to expand its influence in Niger. 

    • France and the U.S. were once key military and economic partners but their influence has significantly declined post-coup, with France also losing access to uranium. However, both remain invested in Niger’s security and geopolitical dynamics, particularly in countering insurgencies and competition with Russia and China.

Opportunities and Risks

Opportunities

  • New Regional Alliance: The AES presents an opportunity for stronger regional cooperation. With a focused effort on countering insurgencies in the tri-border area and joining forces, it could enhance security and address shared challenges in the region. 

  • Resource Sovereignty and New Partnerships: The junta’s focus on reasserting control over Niger’s natural resources presents an opportunity for greater economic independence and growth. Severing ties with Western powers, while strengthening partnerships with Russia and China, creates avenues for new foreign investments. Also, this shift could enable Niger to diversify its economic and diplomatic relationships, potentially forming new alliances with other global powers.

Risks

  • Deteriorating Security Situation: The shift in Niger’s counterterrorism strategy, withdrawal from international coalitions, and reliance on Africa Corps have led to an escalation in violence and civilian casualties. If this approach continues, it could provide jihadist groups with greater opportunities to expand their territorial control and recruitment efforts, further deepening instability across the country.

  • Regional Destabilisation: The lack of strong regional and cross-border alliances beyond the AES poses a significant risk. Insurgent groups may exploit security gaps, potentially expanding their operations across the Sahel and West Africa. Also, other countries in the region may be encouraged to follow Niger’s example, potentially leading to more coups, shifting alliances, and further fragmentation of regional stability.

  • Economic and Social Risks: Efforts to reassert control over natural resources and severing ties with Western powers risk destabilising key sectors. This shift may result in reduced investment and aid, hindering economic growth and stability. Mismanagement of resources, combined with political instability, could further impede economic conditions and exacerbate the humanitarian crisis.

  • Geopolitical Tensions: Niger’s shifting alliances may intensify geopolitical competition between Western powers, Russia, and China, as each seeks to assert influence in the region.  

Conclusion

Niger’s military coup and subsequent geopolitical shifts have placed the country at a pivotal moment. As security challenges intensify amidst changing alliances, Niger will need to reassess its counterterrorism strategies, alliances, and regional partnerships to effectively address the growing threats. Similarly, the shift toward greater sovereignty over natural resources must be handled carefully, with new international partnerships required to fill the vacuum and drive economic growth. The junta must navigate these challenges to prevent further decline in security, humanitarian conditions, and economic stability.




Tarik Ata
Next