The Politics of Nuclear Power in Europe: Trends, Challenges, and Policy Prospects
24/03/2025 - Written by Denholm Holbrook
The Nuclear Energy Debate in Europe
Since the meltdown of Chernobyl Reactor 4 in 1986, nuclear power has cast a persistent shadow over the European continent, shaping both public perception and national energy policies. For many states, this disaster reinforced the pre-existing deep scepticism about the viability of nuclear energy, a sentiment that was only reignited in 2011 by the Fukushima Daiichi meltdown in Japan, leading some to abandon domestic and cross-border projects all together in favour of energy sources that were deemed to be less risky. Despite this, attributing the divided public and political sentiment solely to these two disasters oversimplifies the issue, as nuclear power’s poor image across the Euro area predates both incidents – though it is certainly fair to say they contributed greatly to it.
However, in recent years, growing pressure on European energy security—exacerbated by geopolitical instability and the need for decarbonisation—has reignited debates on the future of nuclear power regionally. Whilst some countries maintain firm opposition, others are reconsidering nuclear energy as a necessary component of a resilient and sustainable energy mix in the face of contemporary challenges.
The Nuclear Divide in Europe
The “Pro-Nuclear” Bloc:
The current European pro-nuclear bloc is composed of states such as France, the United Kingdom, Finland, Hungary, Poland and Belgium. France spearheads the "Nuclear Alliance", pushing for greater nuclear investment in the EU. As of 2024, France continues to lead globally in the proportion of electricity generated from nuclear energy. Nuclear power contributes approximately 70% of France's total electricity production, a slight increase from previous years.
Despite not being a member of the EU, it is becoming increasingly apparent that re-integration of the United Kingdom is approaching as transatlantic relations continue to deteriorate. Great Britain currently operates eight reactors (with three currently undergoing decommissioning) – with four aging, advanced gas-cooled reactors that are due to be closed between 2026 and 2028. The majority have been installed by a French company (EDF), with the corporation also constructing the new Hinkley Point C plant. The Labour government has announced plans to develop Small Modular Reactor (SMR) production in partnership with the private sector, with Rolls-Royce being shortlisted in the UK’s competition to select a developer. The UK aims to quadruple its nuclear power generation by 2050, directly citing the Russian invasion as a key driver for enhanced energy securitisation.
Belgium has historically opposed nuclear power, with a 2003 law mandating a gradual phasing-out of nuclear power by 2025. However, recent geopolitical and energy security concerns—especially following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2022—have led to a policy reversal, with Belgium now extending the operation of key nuclear reactors. Furthermore, Belgium’s newly formed coalition government (2024) has unveiled plans to double nuclear power generation, a move spearheaded by Energy Minister Mathieu Bihet.
Poland, which has historically lacked nuclear power generation since the cancellation of the Żarnowiec Nuclear Power Plant in the 1990s—due to rising public opposition following the 1986 Chernobyl disaster and shifting economic priorities—is now set to launch its first commercial nuclear reactors by the mid-2030s. The country’s first nuclear power plant is scheduled to begin operations in 2036, with a second unit expected to follow in 2037.
The “Anti-Nuclear” Bloc:
Prominent EU states, such as Germany, Italy, Denmark, and Austria, refuse to re-engage with nuclear energy, either out of principle or function. Germany shut down its last of 33 reactors in April 2023, marking the culmination of its long-standing phase-out policy, while Italy has closed all four of its nuclear plants, maintaining its stance against nuclear power. Germany's policy of Energiewende (energy transition) stipulates carbon neutrality by the advent of 2045, committing instead to primarily solar and wind sources. Despite this, the decline in Germany’s nuclear energy commitments can—at a fundamental legislative level—be traced back to the 2002 German Atomgesetz (Nuclear Energy Act), which was amended to mandate the decommissioning of all nuclear plants after 32 years of operation, effectively banning the construction of new reactors. This legislative entrenchment of anti-nuclear policy is not unique to Germany; Austria has gone even further, with public pressure so concentrated that nuclear power has been constitutionally banned since 1999. In 2022, Austria, backed by Portugal and Denmark, took its opposition to the EU level, suing over the legal classification of nuclear energy as "green energy”. Despite this, Austria has achieved remarkable progress in renewable energy, with renewables now accounting for 75% of its total energy production.
Public Opinion & Legacy of Chernobyl and Fukushima
The legacy of nuclear disasters such as Chernobyl (1986) and Fukushima (2011) continues to shape European attitudes toward nuclear energy, leaving member states deeply divided on its role in the future energy mix.
In Germany, large anti-nuclear protests continue, driven in part by the Green Party, which has long maintained its opposition to nuclear energy. Their stance, rooted in decades-old concerns about safety and waste disposal, has played a significant role in shaping Germany’s nuclear phase-out. Opposition to nuclear power in Germany has been persistent since the late 1960s and 1970s, with many activists opposing both nuclear weapons and civilian nuclear energy in parallel. Analogous to Germany, in May 1986, following the Chernobyl disaster, over 100,000 protesters assembled in Rome to voice their opposition to Italy’s nuclear energy program.
However, critics argue that this view is outdated and ignores nuclear power’s potential as a safe, reliable, and low-carbon energy source – a view supported by the EU institutionally. Further, more recent critics have claimed that Economics Minister Robert Habeck (of the German Green Party) may have acted on an ideological basis that ignored or disregarded the position of experts over the nuclear phase-out. Habeck's stance has also faced criticism for placing Germany at odds with other European nations—most notably Sweden (with approximately 40% of their energy mix being nuclear), which recently condemned Germany’s policy for exacerbating energy costs across Europe—as these countries actively invest in nuclear energy as a cornerstone of their decarbonisation strategies. Sweden's energy minister Ebba Busch stated that Germany’s phase out of nuclear power hasnuclear has been “irresponsible”, and that they have ignored the basic rules of physics in favour of politics – inadvertently resulting in increased energy importing costs for EU members. Despite this opposition, public opinion across Europe is shifting. Recent polls in Belgium reveal strong public backing for nuclear power, with 70% of respondents favouring expanded reactor capacity, while only 16% support maintaining the phase-out—underscoring the growing recognition of nuclear energy’s role in bolstering energy security and driving decarbonisation efforts.
Russia’s Energy Leverage: Strategic Implications for Europe
Russia’s actions since 2014 have underscored the vulnerabilities of European energy dependence, with EU states heavily reliant on Russian gas prior to 2022. However, this reliance has significantly declined, with EU imports of Russian gas dropping from 45% in 2021 to just 15% by 2023. In response, the EU has implemented measures such as the EU Energy Platform, established on April 7, 2022, to strengthen energy security through coordinated demand aggregation and joint natural gas purchasing. Additionally, the REPowerEU plan (launched in 2022) aims to further enhance energy security by promoting energy savings, accelerating the clean energy transition, and diversifying energy imports.
Despite these efforts, Russia continues to dominate the global nuclear export market, with Rosatom allegedly controlling 70% of the sector, raising concerns about Europe’s failure to compete in this strategically significant industry. Europe hosts some of the world’s most advanced nuclear research institutions, such as CERN in Switzerland and ITER in France, yet it has not developed a unified nuclear export strategy. Unlike many European nations, Russia offers comprehensive, state-backed nuclear deals through Rosatom, covering financing, development, and long-term maintenance.
This approach creates dependencies on Russian technology and fuel, ensuring Moscow’s continued influence even as Europe reduces reliance on Russian fossil fuels. Western nuclear firms, such as France’s EDF and UK-based companies, struggle to compete with Russia’s full-service agreements and financing models, limiting their global reach. The Russian invasion of Ukraine has further reinforced the urgency of energy security, prompting a reassessment of Europe’s reliance on Russian energy supplies and driving renewed interest in alternative energy sources, including nuclear power, to ensure long-term stability and independence.
While most of this decline stemmed from reduced natural gas trade with Russia, it nonetheless reflects a broader and more protracted shift toward energy independence. This represents not only an effort to reduce the European energy bill, but to also securitise against Russian and possible US disruption to the energy mix.
Europe’s broad hesitation to challenge Russia’s dominant status as a powerful energy supplier poses a variety of strategic problems, as in neglecting the development of nuclear power, Russia has cemented its dominance in energy exports while simultaneously redirecting its gas and oil supplies eastward to compensate for the loss of European markets. At present, the most significant obstacles to forging a European nuclear export consensus lie in political will, public trust, and funding—challenges that must be overcome if there is any hope of achieving a meaningful accord to securitise energy.
Future of European Nuclear: Policy & Technology
Could Germany’s CDU Victory Revive Domestic Nuclear Plans?
The recent CDU victory in Germany marks a potential turning point for one of Europe's most entrenched and influential anti-nuclear strongholds. German plans for deficit spending could accelerate these changes more rapidly than in other states, despite persistent political resistance, by utilising deficit-financed subsidies, tax credits, and loan guarantees to incentivise domestic energy firms to investment. Jens Spahn, the deputy parliamentary leader of the CDU, has recently stated that “It is in our national interest to retain the option of nuclear power”. A reversal of the anti-nuclear stance will be difficult due to the deeply rooted policy implications of Energiewende, though despite this, the CDU has indicated that it wishes to return to nuclear power “as quickly as possible”. Italy is similarly in the early stages of a possible domestic revival, with a draft law for the creation of a legal framework to re-introduce being approved by the Council of Ministers – a first for the state since 1987.
Small Modular Reactors (SMRs) and Large Scale Nuclear: Europe’s potential nuclear revival?
The advent of SMR reactor technology therefore provides an exciting outlet to revive energy security in Europe – which the EU having provided a key endorsement of SMR technology in 2023 in order to meet the climate, energy security, and industrial strategy of the European Green Deal (2019). Regarding funding, Horizon Europe is the EU’s key program for research and innovation projects of €95.5 billion – running in parallel with Euratom; . Around €1.38 billion of this is dedicated to EU-funded research on nuclear issues, with allocations to fission research being €288 million, with this program running until late 2025. Large scale reactor designs such as pressurised water reactors are currently being pursued by the Polish Council of Ministers, who have agreed to earmark over PLN 60 billion (about €14 billion) in state funding as equity for the first plant’s project company which will deploy three Westinghouse AP1000 pressurised water reactors (PWRs) at the Lubiatowo-Kopalino site. This marks a significant step in Poland’s nuclear ambitions, reducing reliance on coal and imported energy while aligning with broader European efforts to bolster energy security through nuclear power. Recently, the European Council has proposed an extension for the Euratom framework to run until 2026-2027 under the existing multiannual financial framework (MFF). While this is likely to occur, securing long term investment past 2027 will be essential for the continued success of the program – which would only be aided by a streamlining of regulation and political consensus across EU states.
Fusion Energy: Europe’s Long-Term Bet?
French and British prospects continue to lead the way for nuclear developments, with discussions on deeper cooperation gaining momentum. The possibility of expanding Euratom’s role—potentially integrating the UK more closely post-Brexit—has been floated as a means to strengthen European energy security, supply chains, and research collaborations. As France advances its vision for a European nuclear renaissance through the ITER Project and the UK signals a renewed commitment to nuclear investment with the JET (Joint European Torus) facility, the prospect of an expanded partnership remains a pivotal consideration in strategic energy planning. While discussions of the possibility of fusion replacing fission are ongoing, fusion energy is not yet a viable or reliable source for large-scale power generation. Therefore, advanced fission technologies should remain the primary focus of a flexible and pragmatic European energy strategy. Additionally, the feasibility of nuclear fusion falls beyond the remit of this article and is best assessed by experts specialising in fusion energy. While ongoing advancements in fusion technology are promising, this discussion remains speculative at present and warrants further expert analysis.
The Future of Nuclear in Europe: A Comeback or a Decline?
From the examples outlined in this report, it is clear that nuclear power is experiencing a resurgence across Europe. However, several bastions of anti-nuclear resistance remain firmly entrenched and are unlikely to shift unless policymakers and the public adopt a more fact-driven approach to the realities and challenges of nuclear energy. With the EU aiming to become the world’s first climate neutral continent by 2050, it is clear that achieving this goal will require nuclear power as part of the energy mix.
Policy Recommendations
To strengthen energy security and global competitiveness, the Euro area must prioritise joint investment and collaboration in nuclear projects. This is essential not only for domestic energy stability but also to counterbalance Russian and U.S. dominance in nuclear technology and exports.
By strategically investing in developing markets that would benefit from Small Modular Reactors (SMRs), European states can expand their influence through targeted partnerships. This can be achieved more broadly by adopting elements of the Russian and French diplomatic approach, where nuclear energy promotion is integrated directly into collective and domestic foreign policy. Leveraging French embassies and consular networks to support nuclear agreements, facilitate knowledge transfer, and coordinate project financing will strengthen Europe’s position in the global nuclear market—allowing states to remain competitive, secure key contracts, and establish a broader foothold as a nuclear power.
Public opinion will continue to play a decisive factor in Europe's commitment to nuclear energy. To build support, governments should launch public awareness campaigns highlighting the safety, efficiency, and environmental advantages of nuclear power, with a particular focus on Small Modular Reactors (SMRs) and next-generation reactor technologies, including factual discussions regarding about nuclear disposal and safety. Further education should explore the role of nuclear energy in the EU’s energy mix and security and could be conducted jointly with the IAEA, providing balanced comparisons with alternative energy sources such as solar and wind. This would help foster a more informed public discussion on the capabilities and advancements of modern reactor technology since the accidents of Chernobyl and Fukushima. Whether nuclear power serves as a cornerstone of that future will depend not only on technological breakthroughs but on the political will to embrace an energy strategy that is both ambitious and pragmatic in the face of both global and regional challenges.