The shift away from the CFA francs – a resistance to French influence, an impetus for de-Westernisation?
09 January - Written by Amriza B. Batubara
Introduction
On the 6th of January 2025, Macron made a statement of disdain against African leaders. Calling out predominantly its ex-French colonies, it called their recent distancing from French military support as “ungrateful” and that none of the Sahelian countries would exist had it not been for France, quickly retorted by Senegal and Mali. This sentiment echoes a broader loss of faith against Western powers in Africa, which outside of the military, has been manifested in a quieter rhetoric revolving around desires for monetary and financial distancing.
Concurrent to debates on French influence is the inverse trend of adopting a new currency away from the CFA franc - a currency that is to date pegged to the euro as underpinned by the French treasury and market - into a new “eco” currency. While preliminary readings may interpret the rather eccentric policy shift as a common disdain for the normative idea of being leased to volatile currencies prima facie, there is growing socio-economic tumult entwined with economic discourses behind these tectonic changes.
With the ECOWAS backing a new currency called “eco”, came the narrative of the “eco” no longer being a desire but rather a need. A need that stems from the dire need to de-peg from the French reserves it had long relied on, as its European counterpart ripped open a chasm of disparities following the COVID pandemic and the treasury response to the war in Ukraine - rhetoric shared among numerous especially rapidly developing or developed Global South states with the US dollar, questioning its credibility as a standard. The sentiment is strong in “Coup Belt” countries, where democracy is fragile and regime changes frequent and has ultimately become the petri dish playground for different spheres of influence to jostle.
Could this be the reason for growing multipolarity, and can opportunist blocs such as the BRICS get along with the bandwagon as well? It has become apparent these last few years that the force is to “kick the Western foreigners out”, with the CFA franc becoming the one bargaining token that makes and breaks its relations with French troops, long having boots on the Saharan grounds.
Contextual Analysis
Since the 1960s, France has become a long-standing yet notorious investing creditor to many Sub-Saharan countries just as it is a Euro user itself. One of the most influential states in the European Union, many countries gained faith in the French credit and its contribution to the organisation, which is only added further by its colonial history in many of these mainly West and Central African states.
However, despite going defunct already, the franc is still used actively in over 18 West African states as the CFA – the West African CFA franc. France invested over 50% of its central bank shares to itself, making these states hardly gain any profit should revenue be generated. This causes a cycle of poverty to persist despite net positive economic growth rates (as France’s economy grows, so does theirs).
Over the 2020s specifically, coups have proliferated in the Sahel region with nations, with Burkina Faso (a CFA franc user) overtly seeing a change of regime favourability, as its coup d’etat in September 2022 saw its pro-France interim President Paul-Henri Sandaogo Damiba ousted from office in favour of pro-Russia militia. Many of those perpetrating this coup – including the military – cited the then-incumbent government’s complicity in collaborating with the French as the reason behind its corrupt cabinet, lack of progress or advancement and thus lack of opportunities and investment.
Key players & Stakeholders
France - At its peak, 10,000 French troops were stationed in West Africa. A superimposing European power maintaining colonial ties in the economic and military realm in West Africa, France was until late the largest donor in the continent, receiving one-third of France’s bilateral official development assistance numbering at €2.9 billion in 2020 and over 36.8% of its aid in the following year, totalling at $4.7 billion.
Mali - A frontrunner in West African turmoils, it became the forefront of news when Mali not only deposed a Western-backed leader but overhauled its military and UN peacekeeping programs as well before withdrawing from the ECOWAS.
Burkina Faso - This West African state experienced two coups in 8 months that divided a nation. Replacing a pro-Western government with a supposedly Russian-backed military junta on its second coup, Burkina Faso has found itself as an unlikely combat field not only between internal factions but between the West and Russia too.
Central African Republic - An interesting actor in the CFA that is otherwise a minor power, it adopted Bitcoin as legal tender in 2022 as an act of resistance against the volatility of the franc.
Senegal - Senegal acts as a vehement opposition, standing against foreign forces, as the government aims to close all “foreign bases” in the nation by an unspecified time in December 2024. This also indicates a broader opposition to military support and aid, in favour for development which Chad has welcomed especially with China.
Chad - Similar to their surrounding environs, Chad vehemently stands the West in favour of Russia and China, as it withdrew a defence cooperation pact with France in November 2024. With dismay, its military junta stated that France’s presence “no longer met the expectations or interests of the party”.
Russia - An unlikely dynamo in the region, taking precedence over China, Russia, under Lavrov’s direction catapulted a range of military governments through a constant streamflow of weapons - in a way similar to how the Americans supplied the Taliban pre-1989 in response to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan.
Economic, social & military dimensions
Economic: West African states are financially ill-represented despite having over half of their stocks leashed into this European power. In the case of the Burkinabé government pre-coup, the advent of the Ukrainian conflict and Russia’s invasion into the state saw many of its funds and budget allotted to war relief, which only further frustrated these African economies that still depended on the French market despite its change to the euro already. In furtherance to broader inefficiencies of the organisation representing the franc, Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger have since withdrawn from the ECOWAS union out of retaliation, backed by its coup governments,
Social: Protests have flared around the Sahel, especially concentrated in capital cities such as Burkina Faso’s Ouagadougou, where concerns of neglect for regional issues such as Ukraine and then-incumbent leader Damiba’s inability to suppress the nation’s growing Islamist insurgencies became resonant with other nations. Sensing a disconnect between host and recipient states, there is growing support for the Russian government as a military donor with little conditions for assistance, along with a wave of anti-French sentiment due to distrust.
Military: Parallel to the blueprinting of an “eco” currency, was some decommissioning of several foreign bases in Saharan countries like Mali. Long a bastion of European and UN forces, Mali under Assimi Goita saw a withdrawal of French troops in 2022 dubbed Operation Barkhane, whereby French troops were to be relocated to Niger in a 6-month window. Wider implications were observed with Mali’s purging against the UN peacekeeping program MINUSMA in the state at the end of 2023, and a reprisal of successful coups in the Coup Belt, resulting in a succession of new military juntas entering in Burkina Faso, Niger and Gabon.
Opportunities & Risks
Opportunities:
Opportunity for rapidly industrialising and developing countries to invest.
The new bloc of industrialising countries largely aligns with membership in the non-alignment movement, meaning they are apolitical and therefore strategically unconstrained.
With a power vacuum and little investment from preceding Western powers - often tied by “rules-based” orders of the IMF, the World Bank and other global institutions -, countries like China may.
Chance for the NDB to expand its remit to the country to help develop the currency - with local support and community resourcing.
Non-interventionism is at the heart of BRICS. And with the New Development Bank (NDB) being BRICS’ financial arm, it can utilise its Contingent Reserve Arrangement to help build a laissez-faire reserve on top of developmental schemes, not the very least an interim one as the nations consolidate. While of course, it is up to the government to bridge existing political and ideological gaps to consolidate a sense of sovereignty, an NDB-led ad hoc arrangement for treasury could have better implications as opposed to a UN-administered body, as NDB’s low-conditionality market approach yet internal bureaucratic processes may prove to take on an ombudsman-like role instead of being cumbersome.
Unrepresented “under-society” can be linked further with local governmental authorities through developmental incentives.
Growing resistance is only precipitated further by a lack of access to communication, which stems from the lack of facilitation. A lack of infrastructure means room for private tech agencies such as Starlink to set base and expand on critical facilities such as power lines and signal towers, in the condition of expecting little return from the government. Memorandums must be established, but by maintaining distance from respective political arenas, one may set their sights on a new market once dissent stabilises.
Risks:
Renewed foreign dependency under despotic regimes.
The proliferation of Russia's influence through the newfound governments means West Africa won’t stray away from foreign influence in the foreseeable future. This dependency may mean the CFA reserve will only transfer hands to another foreign regime, and ultimately give little to no change in representation - making entry hard for foreign investment. Russia is a highly sanctioned market with blanket bans on IBAN and SWIFT - two of the world’s most prolific cashflow systems - will inevitably make business difficult.
Development is restricted to military interests, and the Coup Belt will persist.
De-Westernisation only means a distancing from Western influence but does not necessarily create a moment of healing. China has Belt and Road Initiative ambitions, but is unlikely to expand its ambit to the Sahel region given Russia’s heavy presence in sponsoring Burkinabé and Malian governments under Ibrahim Traoré and Assimi Goita; the former expressing his interests in forging “closer ties” to Turkey and Russia explicitly. That said, the region sets out for stagnating economies with little growth prospects and a forecast of recession given their warmongering markets, and both investors looking inward toward Africa and African investors can only wait and see until BRICS is to gear up further (developmental change).
Bad digital credit in the short term, future manufacturing powerhouse the next.
Africa is projected to become a manufacturing hub in 2100. However, where its powerhouse lies is subject to debate, and if Sahel countries want to compete with the likes of prospective leads such as Rwanda, South Africa or Nigeria, they must ensure their military coups are more “compliant” to the rules-based world order by among other things, auditing and ensuring transparency. The latter has long been a bone of contention given the perceived notion of being imposed by Western imperialism by design. Concerned regimes must learn how to adapt to local tastes and synthesise community-centred dialogues to perfect an ideal international image, to gain needed growth even in government.
Conclusion
Growing infrastructural projects for development may ensue and ensure visionary plans that speak to society and eventually project a stable “de-Westernisation” beyond simply creating a new currency.
A new currency would be proven futile if not for a systemic overhaul, not just in the sense of cutting ties but also in creating new systems with local minds, local talent and local demands. Certain developmental projects spearheaded by developing countries would suit as they tailor to anything but conditionality - a favourite card Western enterprises tend to use.
With enough communications and materialistic assistance, visionary plans such as that described by President Touadera can create transparent, democratic and therefore efficient monetary systems that can make a country more investment-friendly - and that applies to the prospective eco as well.
Furthermore, new facilities can bring digitisation that brings much-needed connections from the national currency reserve into the world of fintech and digital industrialisation. Credit, digital nomads and adjacent tech sectors may come about once set up, and the rapid increase of Internet utilisation will eventually integrate West African states into the global stage.