Xenophobic Violence in South Africa and the Government’s P/CVE Initiatives
17/03/2025 - Rex Obiwuru
Introduction
Far-right extremism is a cyclical and resurgent entity, often emerging in different forms and contexts throughout history. This is evident in the cases of fascism, Islamophobia, QAnon, anti-Semitism, and xenophobia in diverse countries’ contexts. In South Africa, xenophobia—anti-immigrant sentiments—is a socio-political reality. Though not a new phenomenon, especially when one turns the pages of history to where it all started in 1994, xenophobic violence is arguably the biggest national security threat in South Africa in recent times.
The magnitude of the violence, its protracted nature and its possible diplomatic implications make it a worrisome and compelling case for scrutiny. For three decades, xenophobic violence has remained a disturbing thunderstone in South Africa, with 24 incidents recorded in the first decade and 533 and 586 incidents in the second and third decades respectively, statistical evidence shows. Considering this, it is necessary to explore the causes of xenophobia in South Africa, the government’s preventing/countering violent extremism (P/CVE) initiatives and their possible implications for regional integration and security.
Causes of Xenophobic Violence in South Africa
Central to understanding xenophobic violence is the grasp of the whispers that ignite the storm. There are several factors that fuel the violence. The first to be considered here is the apartheid legacy. The apartheid past of South Africa has so much to do with the current wave of violence. The xenophobes learned some negative lessons from history. They understood from the apartheid regime that: (i) violence is an indispensable weapon for claiming and retaining power; (ii) opposition to a system must be crushed or dealt with through the instrumentality of force and violence; (iii) to have enough space for oneself and enjoy the comfort that comes with it, displacement of immigrants is a command of necessity; (iv) marginalisation is legitimate and permissible; and (v) foreigners are not friends but foes who must not be trusted—foreigners were the engineers of their apartheid misery.
The next factor responsible for the xenophobic violence is extreme nationalism. The xenophobes believe that building a nation requires a high degree of separation—separation of the sheep from the goats, drawing a sharp line of distinction between what is truly of the nation and what is not. A poster from an anti-immigrant event held on June 16, 2021, in Soweto provides some evidence of extreme nationalism. It read: “We will be removing all [...] foreign nationals by force!!!”
Finally, xenophobia is greatly shaped by frustration. This is not strange, especially when one recalls the basic tenet of the frustration-aggression hypothesis proposed by John Dollard and colleagues in 1939, which maintains that there is a strong relationship between frustration and violence. Communities in South Africa are faced with the problems of hunger, poverty, unemployment, inequality and poor government performance. While it is considerably rational to hold the government accountable for these problems, the xenophobes, out of frustration and seeing the immigrant population as a convenient target, resort to scapegoating. They place the blame on immigrants, framing them as the reason for the ills of their society and the cause of increased competition in their communities.
Government’s P/CVE Initiatives
South African government’s response to xenophobic violence can be classified into two broad categories: strategic policy response and law enforcement. Efforts to address xenophobia through strategic policy development and implementation date back to the early 2000s. A clear example is the national government’s decision to abide by the Declaration adopted at the World Conference against Racism, Racial Discrimination, Xenophobia and Related Intolerance (WCAR) held in Durban in 2001. Another step in the same direction is the adoption of the National Action Plan (NAP) to combat racism, racial discrimination, xenophobia and related intolerance in 2019, which was built on the principles of universality, interdependence and indivisibility of human rights, participation and inclusion, progressive realisation, accountability, and equality and non-discrimination. Yet another is the 2012 National Strategy for Developing an Inclusive and Cohesive South African Society. The Strategy aimed to create “a caring an [sic] proud society” where “freedom, democracy and justice” would reign supreme.
On the other hand, there is a police-led initiative to counter xenophobia. The rationale behind the South African government's use of police is rooted in the police’s statutory responsibility in the country: the protection of all residents of South Africa from violence. However important these responses are, available evidence suggests they are arguably ineffective P/CVE tools in South Africa.
Evidence of the weaknesses of the P/CVE and the government’s failures
The first evidence is “denialism.” Both the South African government and the strategic policies it created deny and/or romanticise xenophobic violence. At the African Union summit in Johannesburg in June 2015, for example, President Jacob Zuma emphatically denied xenophobic extremism with a sharp claim that “South Africans are not xenophobic.” His predecessor, Thabo Mbeki, equally made a similar claim, noting that “he had never met a xenophobic South Africa” and that xenophobic violence is a mere “criminal activity.”
Importantly, it took the government eighteen years to create and adopt the NAP above, despite the agreement at the World Conference in 2001 that all states should “establish and implement without delay national policies and action plan to combat [...] xenophobia.” The urgency that the 2001 agreement demanded was tossed to the side as prolonged debate on whether the term “xenophobia” was to be included in the NAP ensued. To assert the inefficacy of the strategic policy P/CVE initiative, Jonathan Crush, migration studies professor at the Balsillie School of International Afairs, Waterloo, Canada, argued, “The plan is extremely light on detail, treating xenophobia in a perfunctory manner, providing no information about the nature and extent of the phenomenon, and proposing few steps to deal with it.”
Another example is selective enforcement by the police or dereliction of duty. The police have been accused several times of negligence. They often watch attacks on immigrants take place without intervening. Moreover, when they did intervene and apprehend perpetrators, they usually released them without charges, making it plausible that they were either unfit for the job or on the side of the xenophobes.
Finally, there is also the evidence of state agents’ complicity. Government representatives engage in xenophobic violence. High-ranking government officials and politicians have also been accused of stoking the fires of xenophobic violence by offering protection and motivation to the xenophobes.
What implications does this have for regional integration and security?
South African government’s denial of xenophobic violence could be interpreted by the African community and, by extension, the international community as political callousness. We have seen similar cases in history where such denials by national governments (e.g. the Sudanese government’s denial of the Darfur genocide and the Chinese government’s initial denial of the Tiananmen massacre) triggered international outrage and condemnation.
Though it may be diplomatically sound to protect a nation’s image abroad, which is presumably the reason for the South African government’s denial propaganda, caution is a moral imperative because diplomacy is a game of reciprocity. No doubt, reciprocal violence and actions have already started in some parts of Africa. News reports have shown popular Nigerian artists, Burna Boy and Tiwa Savage, boycotting concerts in South Africa; Zambia’s and Madagascar’s football associations boycotting international friendly matches against South Africa; Ethiopian government demanding from their South African counterpart unalloyed protection of Ethiopian nationals in their country; Air Tanzania suspending flights to Johannesburg indefinitely; South African investments (e.g. MTN and DStv) destroyed in Nigeria; and Nigerian government repatriating their citizens from South Africa and boycotting the World Economic Forum summit in Cape Town. This will worsen inasmuch as the weak government P/CVE initiatives characterised by denial game and selective enforcement are continually applied, thereby leading the country to forced isolation.
What is the way forward?
It is important to reiterate that the grand cause of xenophobic violence in South Africa is frustration caused by poverty, unemployment and other poor socio-economic conditions, which leads to scapegoating. Therefore, a socio-economic P/CVE approach—in this case, government-led socio-economic empowerment—becomes vital in tackling xenophobia effectively.
It is worth noting that the government-led economic empowerment P/CVE approach has been adopted in other countries’. Examples include Chile’s Solidario programme established in 2002; Kenya’s National Strategy to Counter Violent Extremism launched in 2016; Nicaragua’s Social Protection Network; and Colombia’s Familias en Acción programme. These examples demonstrate how different countries have leveraged socio-economic development within P/CVE frameworks to address violent extremism and/or issues that could lead to radicalisation.
In South Africa, the empowerment programme should first target provinces such as Gauteng, KwaZulu-Natal, and Western Cape, where competition for resources and jobs is very high due to their large immigrant populations. Later, the programme can extend to other provinces. It should alleviate poverty and provide employment and skills acquisition opportunities, scholarships to improve access to education, family support funds, and good and affordable healthcare services.
Undoubtedly, the government-led economic empowerment P/CVE approach has some ethical issues. Thus, at the planning and execution stages, the following possible ethical issues must be considered for optimal results:
Inclusiveness: The beneficiaries of the empowerment programme must be clearly defined to avoid favouring South Africans over immigrants, which would most probably trigger the “us” versus “them” narratives. So, the grand question is whether the empowerment programme should focus on nationality or need.
Accountability and transparency: The success of any socio-economic empowerment initiative hinges mainly on the credibility and transparency of the system/process. Hence, the system must be corruption-free, and the programme’s personnel must be impeccable, subscribing wholly to the principles of fairness, transparency and accountability.
Instrumentalisation: Caution must be applied while executing the programme, or it will be hijacked for political gain or to create political rhetoric rather than dealing with the issues that fuel xenophobia.
Sustainability: A cardinal issue to be addressed here is whether the programme, especially the family support funds, would create dependency. A favourable measure here would be to invest more in education, business startups, and skills acquisition to achieve sustainable results.
The benefit associated with the “welfarist” model of P/CVE suggested in this report is worth mentioning. While the government’s dual responses to xenophobia were principally undermined by denialism, negligence and nonfeasance, the proposed model will accelerate development and create new opportunities without dabbling into the debate on the existence or non-existence of xenophobia in South Africa, making it less political.