Biden’s last-minute Cuba deal: What is in store for Havana under a Trump P

residency?

21/01/2025 - Written by Martha Cheek

Introduction

In a shock promulgation just a few days before the end of his administration, Biden has removed Cuba off of its list of state sponsors of terrorism. The deal, negotiated by the Catholic Church, releases 553 political prisoners, many of whom were arrested at Cuba’s 2021 protests. But with Trump being sworn in in a matter of days, what is the likelihood that this is all for nothing?

The USA put an embargo on Cuba in 1960 as a result of Fidel Castro’s overthrow of US-backed dictator Fulgencio Batista in 1959 and the subsequent expelling of US corporations for the construction of his socialist Cuba. Cuba was put onto the USA’s State Sponsors of Terrorism list in 1982 and, save for a brief thawing around 2014-2016 when it was taken off the State Sponsors of Terrorism list by the Obama administration (reversed by Trump in 2016), US-Cuba relations have essentially been frozen since.

Opportunities

It is important to note that Biden’s action does not lift the 1960 embargo – only Congress can lift this. It is, however, a major development in opening Cuba up to external support; the economic and human consequences of the ‘terrorist’ branding and subsequent exclusion by most international banks have been dire for Cuba, which suffers from regular blackouts and food and water shortages, as well as humanitarian crises, with little opportunities for aid. 

For Havana, the USA has “step[ped] in the right direction”. Cuban Minister for Foreign Affairs Bruno Rodríguez Parrilla stated that this marks a “recognition that the policy applied towards Cuba is an obsolete, failed policy” as “neither the collapse of the economy nor the overthrow of the government has occurred”. There is truth behind the claim that the policy has failed, with original stated policy aims still not being near to fulfilled. The supposed resilience of the Cuban Revolution means many, including various left-wing or Marxist groups around the world, are celebrating a triumph against US aggression.

Risks

It is, however, somewhat unclear why the Biden administration has done this so late, given the likelihood it will be reversed with Trump in office; some Cuban citizens see it as useless or too little too late. Cuban immigrant-born Marco Rubio and new Secretary of State, is a hardliner on policy towards Cuba, stating Cuba “without a doubt” belongs on the terrorism list at the Senate Foreign Relations Committee hearing on 15 January. Without explicitly saying it will be reversed, he emphasised that the next administration is not bound by Biden’s decision and claimed that Trump’s sanctions were only against military-owned company GAESA (Grupo de Administración Empresarial S.A.). According to him, GAESA sits on “billions of dollars” whilst the rest of the country  “because Marxism doesn’t work, because they’re corrupt and because they’re inept”. Leveraging the classic capitalism-and-democracy-first American argument, which has often been used to mask the true intentions – and human consequences – of US actions in Latin America, he finishes lamenting that “The Cuban people have never been able to participate in a political process for almost seventy years now and they are entitled to that”.

Moreover, considering the centrality of the State of Florida to the Trump administration, the centre of the Republican Party and Florida becoming ‘Wall Street South’, coupled with the anti-revolution Cuban diaspora in the state, forces hostile to the revolutionary government hold significant influence in this new administration. It is anticipated Havana’s relationship with Washington D.C. will expectedly deteriorate.

In fact, some worry that the move could actually make Cuba higher on the list of Trump’s targets. It thus seems that Havana will need to brace itself for at least a strong attempt to reverse Biden’s move, or if not, a re-transition into world trade relations that is slower than some may hope. The UK ambassador to Cuba stated he “can’t honestly see any banks changing their business practices and I think they’ll still exclude Cuba”. Mr Parrilla is well aware of this (“we must not be disillusioned or have excessive expectations”), yet is optimistic that a path for improving bilateral relations has already begun to clear, especially given such immense international support. He reiterated Havana’s willingness for dialogue to continue with Trump’s team in his statement.

Cuba may also suffer due to the incoming administration’s hawkish attitude towards China. Dependent on aid from the Soviet Union after the US embargo and, given the Sino-Soviet split of the 1960s and 1970s, China’s involvement with Cuba remained rather static. However, their relationship has strengthened since the 1990s when China stepped in to displace the faltering Soviet Union’s economic support – Beijing has been Havana’s leading trading partner ever since. Their ideological compatibility – along Communist lines, as well as levels of antipathy towards the USA – as well as Cuban geographical proximity, is highly threatening to the US. China welcomed Cuba into the Belt and Road Initiative in 2018, which has strengthened relations with multiple agreements for cooperation since, and in October 2024, Cuba joined BRICS – Trump may well view this expansion as a security threat. 

The Trump administration’s hawkish focus on China, which they see as aggressively pursuing a policy of military and economic supremacy through proxy countries will likely take priority over any genuine efforts towards an improvement in relations with Cuba as a sovereign state. This will be exacerbated by the whispers of a Chinese military base in Cuba around June 2023, but has recently (July 2024 onwards) been partially verified by satellite imagery. Although admittedly lacking in conclusive evidence, reports by Florida-based news outlets paint a picture of geopolitical tensions reminiscent of the build-up towards the Cuban Missile Crisis. 

Policy recommendations

If the Trump administration does wish to prioritise Cuba’s human rights record and corruption, as Marco Rubio implies, and not just as a façade for what is really a continuation of the Monroe Doctrine, or an outdated notion of a battle with a Communist ‘bloc’, then it should not reverse Biden’s actions but continue the dialogue that he has, at the very least, opened. Cuba might then have a real chance at a relationship which will help it face its dire economic crisis, and encourage improvements for its humanitarian record, both of which a complete blockade only exacerbates.

However, given Cuba’s standing as a rather unique point of tension amid US hostility towards China that is only likely to increase once Trump comes into office, it remains unlikely that Cuba will be successful in the great-power-balancing game of multilateralism that many of its fellow Latin American countries are currently intent on.