Turkstream Attacked? But why?

21/01/2025 - Written by Tarik Ata

Introduction

On January 13, the Kremlin stated it had shot down nine Ukrainian drones that had tried to attack part of the Turkstream gas pipeline in what it referred to as an “act of energy terrorism”. Turkstream is one of two, the other being Blue Stream, pipelines that run under the Black Sea to Turkey. Turkstream however is the last gas route connecting Russia to Europe, and is crucial to the energy security of EU member states such as Hungary. 

After Ukraine refused to renew a five-year transit agreement with Russia that expired on January 1, 2025, a move costing Ukraine $800 million in transit fees and costing the Russian state-owned gas company, Gazprom, $5 billion in sales. The idea that Ukraine would destroy remaining routes into Europe to further disrupt Russian energy exports in an attempt to halt the Moscow is not far-fetched. Here’s why.

Why would Ukraine want to destroy the Turkstream? 

The energy export sector is vital to the Russian economy. In 2023, for example, oil and gas revenues accounted for more than one-third of Russia’s federal budget, and supplies through Turkstream reached some of their highest levels on record in July 2024. Therefore, Ukraine would want further to disrupt these routes to Europe to damage Russia economically. The alleged attack on Turkstream would do just that, as it is the last European entry point for Russian gas exports. Turkstream made up 31% of all gas that reached Europe in 2024 - therefore an important transit route. 

Moreover, once the transit agreement between Ukraine and Russia ended, Moldova ceased receiving cheap Russian gas, which has maintained its economy for decades. Russia has blamed Ukraine for refusing to renew the expired gas transit agreement.

In contrast, Moldova blamed Russia, stating it could use an alternative route to continue the supplies. The Moldovan President Maia Sandu has called on Turkstream to be used as an alternative route to supply gas to Moldova’s separatist region, Transnistria, to calm political and social unrest in this region, which was engaged in a brief war with Moldova in 1992 and still hosts 1,500 Russian soldiers.

Therefore, an attempted attack on Turkstream by Ukraine to prevent alternative gas routes to the pro-Russian separatist region of Transnistria, which shares a 252 to 282-mile border with Ukraine, in attempts to disrupt the pro-Russian regions access to gas is not illogical.

Potential Russian disinformation? 

Despite the strategic logic behind Ukraine supposedly wanting to destroy the Turkstream to sever Russian gas transits to Europe, the press statements made by Russia may also be disinformation. Moscow may wish to portray Ukraine as attempting to destroy gas transit infrastructure for multiple reasons. 

Firstly, it will provide legitimacy to the Kremlin’s claims that Ukraine’s allies, the US, attacked the Nord Stream pipeline in 2022 - because if they attacked one pipeline to Europe, why not another?

Ukraine is portrayed as a reckless actor seeking to further destroy the supplies of gas to Europe and cause price increases. This would increase negative EU public opinion on Ukraine.  Moreover, it provides military justifications to retaliate and target Ukraine's gas infrastructure, which happened on 15 January. The Russian strikes on the Liviv Gas Storage facility were claimed to be a response to Ukraine’s attempt to disrupt the TurkStream pipeline.

The timing, too, is important - considering the Russia-Ukraine transit agreement recently ended, many, in Europe (particularly Slovakia, Hungary, Moldova, and Austria), are seeking alternative stable supplies. Moldova suggested using Turkstream to deliver gas to Transnistria, and Hungary - Russian-friendly state in the EU - relies on Turkstream. Therefore, an alleged attack on this vital pipeline would anger Budapest and place them more in favour of supporting the Kremlin's position. 

Moldova, which has a pro-EU government and upcoming parliamentary elections, is placed in a challenging position as its support for Ukraine then puts it at odds with the state’s energy needs and further causes friction between the state and Transnistria as Chișinău is seen to be supporting the state, Ukraine, that has tried to destroy its supply of gas - indirectly endorsing an energy crisis in the breakaway region heightening political tensions. Russia has agreed to send gas supplies to Transnistria, strengthening public opinion in support of Moscow and further damaging relations to Chișinău, and the EU more broadly.

Furthermore, the gas market is currently volatile, and the EU is aware of this and is trying to mitigate it - and so far, has been quite successful at it. But, with alleged attacks on a pipeline connecting Russian gas to Europe that comprised 31% of European gas imports in 2024, we saw the EU markets go into alert, and prices spike - more than 6% in a few hours. This could have been an attempt by Moscow to signal the importance of its energy supplies to the EU (not just Turkstream but also the Ukraine Transit agreement that the EU did not want Ukraine to continue).

Russia’s ‘Pivot to Asia’?

What if Russia just moves away from Europe (apart from states it is on good terms with, such as Hungary, Slovakia, and Serbia) and focuses on exporting to the Global South, such as with the recent long-term gas agreement between Iran and Russia and the proposed Power of Siberia 2 (PS-2) natural gas pipeline strengthening energy routes between China and Russia. 

These projects would grant cheap energy to the Wests adversaries and further strengthen their cooperation, as we see with the 20-year strategic partnership agreement signed between the Kremlin and Tehran on January 17, 2025. This scenario is referred to as Russia’s ‘pivot to Asia’, and encouraging these energy and military partnerships with the US and the EU’s adversaries is a position many analysts have warned about.

However, it is a double-edged sword. Moscow, for instance, is becoming increasingly dependent on the Chinese market as Russia is poised to increase energy exports in 2025 to sustain the ongoing war, which may cause agitation as it could leave Russia economically vulnerable to China. Beijing could, for example, use its markets as political leverage, in the same manner it did to German car manufacturers who rely heavily on the Chinese market for revenue. But saw profits fall as Chinese consumers were encouraged to move towards Chinese EV brands and Beijing provided the EV industry subsidies, totalling to $45.3 billion in 2023 - causing companies like BMW to see profits in China fall dramatically, dropping in its third quarter in 2024 by 61%. But that being said Russia is one of China’s leading energy suppliers and receives a discounted rate compared to European consumers. This is a fruitful relationship, Beijing would not want to disrupt it.

Key Players & Stakeholders

• Russia

  • Seeking alternative routes through friendly states like Türkiye, such as with Turkstream. But this route is at max capacity. Leaving Moscow with further money troubles as the state energy company, Gazprom, will lose out on $5 billion in sales. Gazprom is already struggling economically with significant losses in revenues, this will further hurt the state-owned company.

  • Moscow will continue its pivot to Asia in hopes to recover some of its losses but will also maintain its bilateral relations with cooperative European states, namely Hungary, Slovakia, and Serbia.

• Türkiye

  • Ankara is positioned to be the transit route for most gas flowing westward from the east. Turkiye’s top gas supplier is Russia, which provides more than 50% of the country’s pipeline imports.

  • Türkiye is already a point of transit into Europe with the two Turkstreams and the Trans Anatolian pipeline carrying Azeri gas. 

  • Turkiye is aware of the EU’s desire and increasing actions to ween itself off Russian gas, and Ankara wants to place itself at the forefront of energy distribution. We see this unfolding as Ankara develops its gas storage facilities to export imported gas to European clients.

  • Ankara now seeks to be a transit country and a state where gas pricing is set. Turkiye reinforces this lofty aspiration as it increases output from its gas fields in the Black Sea.

  • Ankara, which now holds significant influence in Syria, is provided the opportunity to develop the Levant Energy Corridor, connecting Europe to Qatar's oil and gas supplies. The upcoming conference on Syria in France due to take place on 13 February, will likely involve discussions on the Levant Energy Corridor and other strategic partnerships as this will offer Europe another alternative to Russian energy.

• Ukraine

  • Ukraine has lost $800 million (or 0.5% of GDP) in transit fees.

  • The contract between Gazprom and Naftogaz Ukrainy lasted from 1 January 2020 to 31 December 2024. Now, Ukraine’s strategic position as an energy partner and storer could be ending.

  • The remaining gas infrastructure, which is largely undamaged could become a military target for Russia if there is no Russian gas in the pipelines.

  • European states like Slovakia, Hungary, and Austria are opposed to stopping gas transits from Russia through Ukraine as they fear they will experience disproportionate economic losses and be put at a competitive disadvantage relative to other EU states. Expect more political positioning of these states against Ukraine.

  • According to Zelensky, a “second energy front” was opened after new gas supply agreements between Slovakia and Russia were made on 8 January.

• Slovakia 

  • Suggested it will withhold Ukraine aid over the halted gas supply and Prime Minister Robert Fico announced a gas crisis would ensue once Ukraine rejected extending the transit agreement.

  • Slovakia has secured gas supply from Russia on 8 January. 

  • In response to this new agreement between Russia and Slovakia, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy accused Slovakia of opening a “second energy front.”

  • The Italian government appears to be ready to support Slovakia in his plan to resume gas supplies , a position with deep political implications. Rome will be used as leverage by Slovakia in the EU to get Russian gas back transiting through Ukraine.

• Hungary 

  • had a 94% dependency on Russian gas supplies in 2020 The 

  • The Hungarian Foreign Minister Peter Szijjarto supports Moscow’s comments and referred to the alleged attack on Turkstream as an attack on the sovereign rights of the countries that use it. 

  • Szijjarto also stated, ‘It is in the common interest of Hungary and Serbia—an interest we will never relinquish—that the TurkStream pipeline operates reliably and safely,’ and suggested Ukraine is jeopardising the energy security of EU member states - while simultaneously wanting to join the union. 

  • Prime Minister Orban responded to the developments, stating, ‘Our task now is to safeguard this pipeline to ensure Hungary’s energy security.’

  • The statements by Moscow of an alleged attack on Turkstream, therefore, only intensified the desire for Budapest to become more energy secure and instigated greater cooperation amongst Russian friendly government in Europe.

• Serbia 

  • Serbia is part of the Balkan Stream, an extension of the Turkstream, and gas flows through Serbia onto Hungary. 

  • Bilateral relations between Serbia and Hungary have strengthened regarding energy security. 

  • Serbia recently faced US sanctions on its main gas and oil company, Naftna Industrija Srbije (NIS), over majority Russian ownership and demanded Belgrade exit entirely from NIS.

Risks?

• Dependence on US LNG

  • Domination of gas imports from the US could raise challenges with a Trump Presidency if EU leaders do not cooperate with Trump's demands and policies. As we have seen, EU imports of US LNG increase on a yearly basis. In 2024 Europe accounted for 55% of total US LNG exports.

  • Rather than Europe being reliant on Russia, the EU are increasingly becoming dependent on the US - which could become troublesome under the unpredictable leadership of Trump.

• Further attacks on gas infrastructure

  • the alleged attack by Ukraine on the Turkstream was a move to further disrupt the flow of Russian gas to Europe and force the EU to halt the use of Russian gas.

  • This could cause prices to rise rapidly and result in societal unrest and political instability. Moreover, it could also contribute to the de-industrialisation of Europe and encourage the movement of companies abroad where the operating costs are lower.

• Energy nationalism

  • An energy war is likely to ensue with misleading government statements likely to be made to cause price fluctuations and subsequently hurt state economies.