Hydro-Politics in the Euphrates-Tigris Basin: Turkish Policy and Post-Assad Opportunities

04/04/2025 - Written by Noah Branigan

Executive Summary

This report provides an in-depth analysis of the evolving hydro-political dynamics in the Euphrates-Tigris Basin in the aftermath of the fall of the Assad regime in Syria. It examines Türkiye's strategic position as the upstream hydro-hegemon and investigates how Türkiye can leverage its geographic and material power to influence regional water management and achieve broader foreign policy objectives in the Middle East as a whole. Employing critical hydro-political theory, the report evaluates Türkiye's historical and future role in the basin through the lens of three key measures of power: material, bargaining, and ideational. Furthermore, the report addresses the impacts of Türkiye's extensive hydroelectric projects on downstream states, particularly in Syria and Iraq, and considers the potential opportunities and challenges in the post-Assad era for Türkiye to consolidate its regional leadership in hydropower and security policy. 

Introduction

With the fall of Assad and the subsequent power vacuum emerging in Syria, the dynamics dictating  hydro-politics in the Euphrates-Tigris Basin (ET Basin) have yet again showcased their fluid nature. Despite already being positioned as the hydro-hegemon due to its material, geographic, and discursive power, Türkiye can now strategically leverage its position of strength to exert influence and achieve its  strategic goals in post-war Syria (Daoudy, 2009). This presents both an opportunity to pave the way for  increased cooperation on regional water management as well as advancing Turkish foreign policy ambitions, particularly in regard to security concerns surrounding the Kurdish issue. 

By employing understandings of critical hydro-political theory, this report seeks to explore the historical role and future of Turkish hydroelectric policy in the ET Basin, exploring regional changes across four  measures of power: material, geographic, bargaining, and ideational. The article first provides  geographic context, followed by a theoretical framework. Following this, an exploration of previous  Turkish hydroelectric projects and their impact downstream is provided. Next, the report presents the power dynamic pre-war and during the conflicts in both Syria and Iraq. Finally, the article seeks to explore how these dynamics could change following the fall of the Assad regime, seeking to provide potential opportunities whereby Türkiye can further develop its position as a regional leader in hydropower whilst also looking to achieve wider regional foreign policy goals. 

The Euphrates and Tigris rivers are the two major rivers in the Middle East, collectively forming a single transboundary watercourse system, the ET Basin (Kibaroğlu, 2017; Chibani, 2023). The ET Basin acts as a crucial water source for Türkiye, Syria, and Iraq, accounting for 35.6% of Türkiye's water potential (Maden, 2020). Economically, it also plays a pivotal role, with the Euphrates River supporting the livelihoods of 60 million people (Chibani, 2023). Within the ET Basin, Türkiye represents the upstream power, with both rivers originating in Eastern Anatolia, whilst Iraq and Syria are the downstream riparian states (Maden, 2020: Climate Diplomacy, 2022; Singh, 2023). 

Historically, the relationship between the three riparian powers have been characterised as dynamic, exhibiting varying periods of both conflict and cooperation (Kibaroğlu, 2017). The absence of international management of water systems has resulted in dam construction, irrigation projects, and water strategies intensifying tensions between three riparian powers - Turkiye, Syria, and Iraq (Singh, 2023; Climate Diplomacy,  2022; Tann & Flamik, 2018). Consequently, this has transformed the ET Basin into a point of competition, underscoring the crucial role of the Basin as a tool in regional power dynamics and stability.

Rising tensions risk being aggravated further by increasing climate change pressures, a growing threat towards the region. Intensifying water scarcity affects all three states with regional temperatures rising twice the global average (Tann & Flamik, 2018). Notably, a 2°C increase in the Mediterranean Basin is predicted to intensify regional drought patterns and evaporation rates, creating additional pressure on regional water access (Tann & Flamik, 2018; Sarhan et al., n.d.; Water in Crisis, n.d.; Singh, 2023).  Declining precipitation rates pose an additional threat, with Türkiye experiencing below-average annual rainfall in 2020 and 2021 (Bozkurt & Sen, 2013; Sarhan et al., n.d.). Bozkurt and Sen's (2013) analysis  of climate change projections on the ET Basin underscore the pressures faced in the ET Basin, finding that in Türkiye, the Euphrates-Tigris flows are expected to drop by 23.5% and 28.5% respectively by the end of the century. This impact on the management of the ET Basin will be severe. Not only will declining water availability disrupt irrigation, energy production, and water usage, but it also presents  a catalyst capable of heightening water access tensions, underscoring the need for effective water management and long-term planning from all three countries (Kibaroğlu, 2017).

'Water Wars' and Hydro-Politics

Hydro-politics has been thoroughly examined in academic literature, though few attempts have been  made to provide a definition (Cascão & Zeitoun, 2010). A useful concept often associated with hydro-politics is water governance. The United Nations Development Program defines the concept as "the political, economic and social processes and institutions by which governments, civil society, and the private sector make decisions about how to best use, develop and manage water resources" (2004, p.10). This definition presents a useful framework for understanding the dynamics underlying hydro-political issues, specifically when exploring socio-economic and political processes as well as the institutions  involved in hydro-political processes. 

Hydro-political issues are often linked to the 'water wars' literature. 'Water wars' links transboundary water management issues to water-related conflicts, drawing attention to the potential for interstate violence resulting from poor water governance and water access tensions (Cooley, 1984; Starr, 1991;  Bulloch & Darwish, 1996). The literature often focuses on the ET Basin, with regional tensions over water access and climate change frequently identified as laying the groundwork for future regional conflicts (Singh, 2023; Tann & Flamik, 2018; Cooley, 1984; Starr, 1991). 

A key challenge identified within the 'water wars' literature is the effective coordination of transboundary water management and cooperation networks between riparian states (Kibaroğlu, 2017).  Notably, Starr (1991) argues that Türkiye, with its substantial water resources, has the potential to act as a stabilising force in managing regional water tensions. However, this potential has yet to be fulfilled, in part due to the Syrian civil war and subsequent breakdown of  effective governance, undermining  transboundary water management and cooperation efforts in the ET Basin (Kibaroğlu, 2017). 

Despite the ET basin being portrayed as a region where a water-related armed conflict may occur, this is yet to happen, resulting in criticism of the 'water wars' narrative (Kibaroğlu, 2017). Cascão & Zeitoun (2010, p.29) argue instead that the constant association with conflict and security has resulted in an "impoverished debate", restricting understanding of hydro-politics as a dynamic process involving multiple factors. In response, they propose the 'critical hydro-political theory' framework, contending  that relationships between riparian states are instead governed by a range of hard and soft forms of  power (Cascão & Zeitoun, 2010). These relationships involve four types of power: geographic, material, negotiation, and ideational (Cascão & Zeitoun, 2010; Daoudy, 2009). These are dynamic, with power configurations shifting in relation to changing political and physical conditions (Cascão & Zeitoun,  2010). When examining the ET Basin through this lens, Türkiye is considered the hydro-hegemon due to its material and discursive power, whilst Syria and Iraq are perceived as non-hegemonic, relying on their negotiation power to respond to Türkiye's dominance (Daoudy, 2009).

Turkish Hydropower and its Downstream Impact

Türkiye's national energy vision emphasises prioritising domestic energy production whilst simultaneously integrating development and climate change policies, focusing particularly on the development of efficient and renewable energy sources (Sarhan et al., n.d.). Hydroelectric power has been prioritised as a key element of achieving this policy, with Türkiye's hydroelectric capacity currently standing at 31,962MW, corresponding to 29.2% of national capacity (Enerji Sektor Raporu, 2024). This large-scale production is attributed to extensive hydroelectric infrastructure, with Türkiye operating 141 hydroelectric power stations with dams and 609 run-of-river power plants as of 2022 (Sarhan et al., n.d.). Türkiye's significant hydropower capacity is the result of decades of sustained investment, primarily within the Southeast Anatolia region which contains approximately 25% of Türkiye's water potential (Maden, 2020; Kibaroglu, 2017).

The cornerstone of these efforts has been the Southeast Anatolia Development Project (GAP), established in 1975 (Tann & Flamik, 2018; Maden, 2020; Daly, 2014). The GAP is a world-leading irrigation and development project, involving the construction of 22 dams, 19 hydroelectric power plants, and several irrigation schemes, with the project expected to irrigate 1.7 million hectares of land and produce 27 billion kWh of hydroelectric power (Maden, 2020; Kibaroğlu, 2017; Haghighi et al., 2023; Ayboga, 2019). The GAP has provided Türkiye with wide reaching benefits including enhanced irrigation, job creation, and electricity generation. By capitalising on its geographical position and relative political stability in comparison to its neighbours, Türkiye has enhanced its material power over the Basin providing it with significant leverage over its downstream neighbours.

Whilst Türkiye seeks to present the narrative that its hydroelectric policies are serving the interests of its downstream neighbours, Iraq and Syria instead perceive Türkiye as asserting itself as a regional hydrological superpower, leveraging its geographic and material advantage to dictate regional water management (Haghighi et al., 2023; Daly, 2014). These worries are enhanced by Turkish dam construction projects. Dam construction is known to exacerbate water access pressures, with Daly (2014) arguing that by altering the ET Basin flows, Türkiye risks escalating social and political unrest within Syria and Iraq. For example, the completion of the Ilısu Dam in 2018 reduced the Tigris flow into Iraq by approximately 47% per year, significantly impacting water availability (Daly, 2014; Singh, 2023; Haghighi et al., 2023).

Downstream agriculture is also impacted by upstream dam construction, underscoring the multifaceted impacts of river flow reductions. In Iraq, agricultural livelihoods have witnessed declining productivity due to reduced river flows resulting in part from upstream damming (Tann & Flamik, 2018; Chibani, 2023). Climate change further compounds these issues, intensifying droughts and aggravating water access pressures, underscoring how the unequal distribution of power has exacerbated underlying vulnerabilities in the downstream riparian states (Ayboga, 2019). Consequently, Türkiye's use of its material and geographic power has driven tensions between the upstream and downstream states, with Iraq and Syria failing to benefit from Türkiye's hydroelectric ambitions, instead witnessing enhanced pressures on their own water resources. However, an important caveat to note is that, whilst the Iraqi government blames Turkish hydroelectric projects for its agricultural challenges, this has been identified as presenting a convenient scapegoat for Iraq to escape accountability for its own water mismanagement (Tann & Flamik, 2018).

Regional Tensions and Power Dynamics

Pre-War:

In recent years, Türkiye's increasing control over the ET Basin has inflamed tensions with Syria and Iraq. Historically, the relationship between the three powers was considered harmonious due to their  limited water usage, however, since the 1960s, the three states have engaged in competing water management projects, heightening regional water-related tensions (Singh, 2023; Climate Diplomacy,  2022). Tensions during the period were dynamic, with attempts to encourage cooperation and  management occurring, including the signing of protocols and agreements such as the 1987 Protocol on  Economic Cooperation between Türkiye and Syria, and a 1989 Bilateral agreement between Syria and  Iraq (Maden, 2020). 

The Turkish-Syrian relationship improved in the 2000s, enabling favourable conditions to address water management challenges, with high-level cooperation discussions held in 2009 (Maden, 2020). In 2008  and 2009, joint foreign policy projects took place between the three powers aimed at tackling climate change, with memoranda of understanding produced addressing water quality management, water  efficiency, drought management, and flood protection, ensuring enhanced cooperation on transboundary water management (Kibaroğlu, 2017). These regular attempts to encourage dialogue and collaboration highlight that the pre-war power dynamic was more balanced, with the three states able to utilise their respective positions to attempt to work collaboratively on Basin management.

The Impact of the Syrian Civil War and Instability in Iraq:

Over a decade of civil war in Syria and decades of instability in Iraq have undermined regional water  management and altered regional hydro-political dynamics to position Türkiye as the hydro-hegemon.  Armed conflict in both countries has destroyed water infrastructure, resulting in acute water shortages and environmental issues including rising desertification (Water in Crisis, n.d.). Additionally, a lack of  water governance has driven water pollution and over-extraction, further straining water management  and access in the two downstream riparian states. 

The conflicts have eroded both countries' abilities to govern and manage water resources effectively. A key conflict dynamic in both Syria and Iraq was the weaponisation of water, with water access and  management being employed as both a weapon and source of political legitimisation for both state forces and non-state actors (Von Lossow, 2020). 

The growing presence of the Islamic State over the last decade saw a rise in water weaponisation as the Syrian and Iraqi governments ceded growing territorial control to the group. Notably, the Islamic State employed control of water to break resistance, exert regional control, and demonstrate its power, reducing the control of Syria and Iraq over their water  management and resources (Von Lossow, 2020). Not only does this highlight the growing significance of the ET Basin and its resources as a tool for geopolitical power, but it also underscores the erosion of Syria and Iraq's hydro-political power in the face of pressures from armed non-state groups. This power vacuum effectively curtailed the material power of both Syria and Iraq, limiting their ability to influence  decision-making within the ET Basin, and opening the way for Türkiye to advance its hydro-political  agenda. 

Within this context, Türkiye has reinforced its position as a hydro-hegemon, further advancing its GAP project and ensuring upstream control of the ET Basin. Türkiye's hydroelectric policy and dominant position have, therefore, presented itself as a useful geopolitical tool, able to utilise its material and  geographic strengths to enhance its negotiation power within the region. For instance, following the construction of the Ilısu Dam, Iraq has had to negotiate a minimum month-to-month flow from Ankara, underscoring Türkiye's ability to use its geographic and material advantage to strengthen its negotiations vis-à-vis Iraq, further entrenching its position as hydro-hegemon (Chibani, 2023). This move has also enabled Türkiye to negotiate favourable economic agreements, advancing bilateral trade with Iraq, exceeding $24 billion in 2022, and facilitating the operations of Turkish construction companies inside  Iraq (Chibani, 2023). Türkiye has, therefore, effectively capitalised on the situation to further entrench its position whilst also advancing its own wider economic objectives. 

Since 2014, Türkiye has also utilised its dominant hydro-political position to reduce the flow of water into Kurdish-controlled Northern Syria, leveraging its hydroelectric infrastructure to advance its regional security objectives (Ayboga, 2019; Chibani, 2023). This highlights Türkiye's ability to employ its geographic and material power to achieve its wider foreign policy objectives, tying hydroelectric policy into the narrative of national security objectives. 

Despite Türkiye's dominant position, Iraq and Syria have both historically been able to utilise their negotiation and ideational power to restrict Turkish dominance within the ET Basin. Notably, the  construction of the Ilısu Dam has faced significant resistance. Iraq and Syria effectively utilised media campaigns and pressured international organisations, employing their ideational and negotiation powers in an attempt to halt the construction of the Ilısu Dam (Maden, 2020; Chibani, 2023). This achieved a  degree of success, with Iraq being able to repeatedly delay the impoundment procedure of the dams construction (Maden, 2020).

Post-Civil War: Shifting Dynamics and New Opportunities

Economic Opportunities:

Türkiye's management of the ET Basin provides it with significant influence via its ability to dictate downstream water availability and flows, presenting Türkiye with new economic opportunities. By employing its geographic and material power, Türkiye can seek to promote its economic interests whilst  effectively contributing to reconstruction efforts within Syria. With much of Syria's energy infrastructure damaged due to the conflict, Türkiye can employ its recent renewable energy successes, with 43% of its energy coming from renewable sources in 2023, to offer a suitable model for Syria's  post-war development (Elgendy, 2024). Consequently, Türkiye can employ its hydropower knowledge to assist in the reconstruction of Syria's energy sector, providing increased investment opportunities for Turkish energy, enhancing both energy security as well as collaboration, and reducing regional water tensions whilst simultaneously providing economic benefits for Türkiye. Notably, this presents an exciting opportunity to advance Türkiye's long-term regional influence, allowing it to reshape its  ideational narrative as supporting regional renewable energy development (Cevik, 2024). 

Additionally, Türkiye can leverage its bargaining power to secure economic gains within the wider reconstruction of Syria. By negotiating water access and flow deals with the new Syrian leadership, Türkiye has an opportunity to secure construction contracts for Syria's reconstruction, estimated at costing $250-400 billion dollars (Cevik, 2024; Elgendy, 2024). Türkiye has already expressed its interest in repairing Syria's roads, airports, energy, and electrical infrastructure, and employing its  negotiation power may prove a valuable strategy in securing favourable conditions for the Turkish construction sector (Cevik, 2024).

Geopolitical Opportunities:

The fall of the Assad regime also presents Türkiye with an opportunity to address its longstanding  security concerns regarding the PKK and Kurdish non-state groups in Northern Syria. In the past, Syria  had contributed to the conflict, providing refuge and security for PKK fighters during the 1980s and 1990s (Siccardi, 2021). Whilst the two states have previously attempted to negotiate deals, notably a  1987 Protocol aiming to stop Syria's support for the PKK in return for favourable monthly flow allocations, Syrian support for the group continued (Maden, 2020; Ayboga, 2019; Siccardi, 2021;  Republic of Türkiye Ministry of Foreign Affairs, n.d.). Tensions between the two states heightened further with Türkiye threatening to cut off the Euphrates flow in 1998 unless Syria ended its support for the organisation (Maden, 2020; Ayboga, 2019; Siccardi, 2021). This dynamic reflects both states' use of power to achieve their aims with Türkiye employing its material strengths in response to Syria's use of  negotiation. 

With Türkiye conducting military operations in northern Syria since 2016 and looking to increase its pressure on Kurdish non-state armed groups, Türkiye can utilise its control of the ET Basin to cooperate with the new Syrian government to address these security concerns (Siccardi, 2021; Istanpol, 2024;  Celik, 2025). Notably, Türkiye has already been working with the new Syrian regime to address these concerns, calling on the YPG to disarm (Celik, 2025). With the change in regime, Türkiye is now presented with multiple opportunities to address the issue. Firstly, it could seek to propose favourable water access and flow arrangements with the Syrian government in order to incentivise Syria to address the issue or create a buffer zone serving Turkish regional security interests. Alternatively, Türkiye could employ its upstream water control to cut off the region or limit its water access, seeking  to force these groups to the negotiating table. Both options underscore the importance of the ET Basin  and its management towards addressing Turkish regional security concerns.

Ideational Opportunities:

Whilst Syria and Iraq have previously accused Türkiye of asserting hydro-political dominance within the Basin, the end of the Syrian civil war presents an opportunity for Türkiye to reshape the narrative. Türkiye has stated that its policies serve downstream impacts, lessening the effects of floods and droughts and enhancing the timing of the river flow to meet the needs of downstream agriculture (Haghighi, et al., 2023). The end of the Syrian Civil War presents Türkiye with an opportunity to reposition itself as a stabilising force in the region, achieved via the promotion of narratives surrounding  cooperative water management and shared prosperity. This can be further achieved through  contributions to Syria's energy reconstruction and seeking to negotiate water management treaties and  open dialogue with both Syria and Iraq. Consequently, this ideational approach can enhance Türkiye's legitimacy both domestically and internationally, framing its actions as beneficial for regional stability  rather than being interpreted as unilateral control over resources, opening up new avenues for  cooperation and regional economic development.

Conclusion

The conclusion of the Syrian Civil War and the fall of the Assad regime offers Türkiye a variety of new opportunities. By leveraging its pre-existing upstream control of the ET Basin, Türkiye is presented with the opportunity to forward its economic and geopolitical aims whilst also providing an opportunity to reshape ideational narratives surrounding its hydroelectric projects within the ET Basin. With material and geographic control of the basin’s rivers, Türkiye can look to negotiate with Syria’s new leadership, fostering cooperation whilst also allowing the development of knowledge sharing, advancing mutual benefits alongside Türkiye's regional economic priorities. Moreover, through knowledge-sharing initiatives and water-management efforts,Türkiye can assert itself as a key player in regional stability, enhancing economic development whilst simultaneously seeking to address security concerns, particularly those related to Kurdish groups in northern Syria. Finally, by contributing  to Syria’s energy sector reconstruction, Türkiye can reshape ideational narratives surrounding its hydro-political objectives, shaping the perceptions of the downstream powers to a more collaborative view, underscoring Türkiye's role as regional provider of stability, environmental sustainability, and economic  development.

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