The Nuclear Gambit: Trump’s Peace Plan for Ukraine and the Question of the Zaporizhzhya Nuclear Power Plant
07/04/2025 - Written by Jake Southerland
Introduction
As of this reports writing, the full-scale invasion of Ukraine rages into its 1,138th day. For the past three years, Ukraine has experienced unimaginable suffering comparable to the horrors of the Second World War in a battle between Russian speaking vs. Ukrainian-speaking, Pro-Kyiv vs. Pro-Moscow, and many more conflicting ideals. According to the BBC, over 95,000 people have died whilst serving in Russia's military, with around 21 to 23,000 of those casualties resulting from service in the militias of the self-proclaimed Donetsk and Luhansk People's Republics. Moreover, approximately 46- 50,000 Ukrainian troops have died. Peace talks between Russia and Ukraine, with Belarus as an ironic mediator, went nowhere. Trump claims to have drawn up a peace plan, yet this has remained to see the light of day. The only grasp of Trump's plans is derived from speculation from international media publications. Current talks in Saudi Arabia have made some headway in mediating current hostilities within the Black Sea, yet progress in ceasing fighting in the air and on land remains unknown.
Putting a pause on the violence on land conveys its difficulties. The question of maintaining a ceasefire that does not mirror the failures of the Minsk agreements of 2015 and 2016 persists. Yet, one forgotten aspect that is a significant factor in halting land hostilities is the Zaporizhzhya Nuclear Power Plant (ZNPP), which has been under Russian control since March 2022. Despite the unknown details of the Trump peace plan, TLDR News, published a video speculating potential aspects of Trump's plans for peace in Ukraine. Their video outlines the strict enforcement of a ceasefire along the current 1300 km (approx. 810 mi) frontline and the establishment of a Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) based on the one that has separated the Korean peninsula since 1953. However, the ZNPP is located near the front lines, emphasising the need for a cautious approach to the plant's fate in a ceasefire.
There are numerous potential outcomes that could result from Trump’s plans in Ukraine. While the details presented in TLDR’s video remain speculative, they currently represent one of the few available discussions on a possible peace plan. Given the absence of an official correspondence from Washington, it is likely that TLDR’s speculation reflects key elements of what such a plan might entail. This assumption provides a foundation for the following three scenarios:
Scenario I: The ZNPP remains under Russian Control (Status quo)
Scenario II: UN/IAEA Controlled Zone with Russo-Ukrainian cooperation (Based on Panmunjom) Trump’s Peace Plan and Zaporizhzhya
Sneario III: UN/IAEA Exclusion Zone around the ZNPP (Based on UN Buffer Zones in Cyprus)
While all three scenarios have differences, they all share one commonality: establishing a DMZ along the current frontline. The reasoning for this is the Minsk Accords' failure in 2015-2016 to convey the need for a hard ceasefire rather than loose agreements. While a DMZ will not prevent all ceasefire infractions, it will drastically decrease the number of violations from both sides. In the subsequent section, each hypothetical scenario is explained in further detail.
Potential Scenarios
Scenario I: Total Russian Control of the ZNPP: Putin’s forces have controlled the plant since March 2022, with Ukrainian-controlled Nikopol on the opposite bank of the Dnipro River. As the introduction conveys, the hypothetical DMZ would run along the current frontline. Russia would undoubtedly accept a peace plan that allows them exclusive control of the ZNPP. Nevertheless, Ukraine would likely not agree to concessions, resulting in the permanent loss of the ZNPP, which provided approximately 23 percent of the country’s electricity before the war. However, Kyiv still controls three other major Nuclear Power Plants (NPPs): Khmelnytskyi NPP, Rivne NPP, and the South Ukraine NPP.
Scenario II: IAEA/UN Control with Russian/Ukrainian cooperation: This situation establishes international oversight of the plant via the UN and the IAEA with joint Russo-Ukrainian control of the plant in a manner that mirrors the famous Panmunjom village in Korea. Naturally, the IAEA would monitor and facilitate the plant operations; however, since the agency lacks security forces, troops will be needed to enforce the order. Yet, to address Moscow’s refusal to allow the stationing of Western peacekeepers in Ukraine, a UN garrison composed of militaries that have contributed the most to peacekeeping missions, such as in Ethiopia, Nepal, or Bangladesh, can be created. This inclusion could alleviate Russia’s concerns about Western participation in Ukraine but still allow Moscow some say in the ZNPP’s future. Additionally, to allow for a multilateral effort in the ZNPP’s operations, a panel of experts from the IAEA, Ukraine, and Russia’s nuclear programs would increase cooperation concerning the ZNPP.
Scenario III: Total UN/IAEA Control of the ZNPP: Lastly, one other potential outcome for peace negotiations concerning the ZNPP could also likely result in DMZ’s establishment but with an exclusion zone created around the ZNPP similar to the UN buffer zone currently monitored by UN peacekeepers in Cyprus. The regional energy grid depends on the ZNPP, so agreements would have to be made to ensure that UN/IAEA initiatives in the plant are not endangered from either side of the frozen frontline. The deployment of Global South UN peacekeepers, as mentioned in Scenario II, would also occur in this situation. Consequently, Russian representatives at the negotiation table would likely challenge a plan that promotes a UN/IAEA monopoly on the ZNPP.
Key Players & Stakeholders
Ukraine: Zelensky and his administration have emphasised their desire to return to “pre-2014 or 1991 borders.” However, the Trump administration, a key player in current negotiations in Saudi Arabia, has called this goal “unrealistic”. As detailed earlier, Kyiv would decisively reject Scenario I as it would grant a Russian monopoly on the plant’s future. Ukraine would likely accept the exclusion zone conveyed in Scenario III because it prohibits Russian meddling in the plant’s operations and provides security mechanisms established by the international community.
Russia: The Russian government has openly rejected the idea of European peacekeepers in Ukraine, conveying that Moscow will “not consider” any plans advocating for the deployment of Western troops in the conflict zone. In this reports hypotheticals, Russia would undoubtedly accept Scenario I since it would grant them exclusive rights to the ZNPP. Scenario III is likely not feasible for Russia because it would grant total control to the UN and IAEA, which Russia sees as western-oriented.
IAEA: As the principal agency for ensuring nuclear safety and security, it is only natural to include the IAEA in hypothetical scenarios concerning the ZNPP’s fate in future peace plans. The IAEA has made over a dozen missions to the plant in the last three years, with some traversing across the frontline and others originating from Russia-controlled territory. Since the IAEA does not possess an armed security force, UN peacekeepers will become necessary. With Ukraine rejecting Russian control imposed by Scenario I, any other hypotheticals, including the ones in this article, will likely have to include the IAEA.
United Nations: The deployment of UN peacekeepers will be necessary to ensure the safety of the ZNPP’s facilities and the IAEA/local staff. Since Russia opposes the inclusion of Western troops, UN “blue helmets” could be drawn up from militaries that have contributed the most to UN Peacekeeping operations, such as Ethiopia, Nepal, Ghana, et cetera.
Dimensions to be Considered
Militaristic:
A DMZ akin to Korea's will lead to a prolonged "standoff" between two powerful militaries.
Russia, with updated Soviet-era and post-1991 weaponry, ranks among the top three global military powers.
Ukraine's military, battle-hardened since 2014 and significantly bolstered by NATO arms post-2022, has drastically improved its firepower.
Economic:
A frontline DMZ would severely impact economic opportunities for both nations.
Russia controls key industrial cities (Donetsk, Luhansk) and major ports (Mariupol, Berdyansk), leveraging Donbas coal reserves for economic gain.
Russia’s dominance over the Sea of Azov ensures easy Black Sea access via Türkiye’s Bosphorus Strait, facilitating the exploitation of Ukrainian resources.
Social:
A DMZ would significantly restrict travel, separating families and disrupting regional cohesion.
Travel between cities like Dnipro and Donetsk has been difficult since 2014 due to ongoing conflict.
While Russian sympathies in Donetsk and Luhansk are well-documented, it's uncertain whether occupied cities like Mariupol or Melitopol share the same sentiments.
Opportunities & Risks
Opportunities:
The possibility of de-escalation and regional stability: The risk of Russia rearming during a ceasefire will always linger. However, an agreement would allow Ukraine to recover from years of war. According to Statista, by 2024, Russia's full-scale invasion has caused 57.6 billion USD in damage to housing and 20.5 billion USD in damages to Ukraine's energy sector. If one of the scenarios in this article is implemented, a "Marshall Plan-style" relief package can be bestowed upon the Ukrainians.
Increased energy security: If the ZNPP came under the control of a UN Peacekeeping operation, the plant's staff and facilities would remain "relatively safe" from potential dangers from a delicate frontline. However, UN peacekeepers have been fired upon in several missions, a plausible reality that could occur in a frozen conflict in Ukraine. Additionally, if the IAEA was a part of the international mission to the ZNPP, they could apply their staff to apply their nuclear expertise to ensure the safety and security of the plant and surrounding area.
The possibility of strengthening multilateralism: By facilitating the ZNPP's operations through joint cooperation between the UN, IAEA, Russia, and Ukraine, multilateralism amongst the four political actors will strengthen over time due to the necessity of clear and precise communication concerning nuclear safety and security. Moreover, including UN peacekeepers from militaries from the Global South would make nuclear safety and security a leading issue in international geopolitics.
Risks:
1. The Continued Risk of a Nuclear Accident: While a ceasefire would drastically lower the chances of a nuclear accident occurring at the ZNPP, a risk persists. UN peacekeeping and IAEA oversight of the facilities would provide a safer environment for the plant's equipment. However, merely one stray missile hitting the plant's reactor or cooling towers would create a nuclear disaster much more significant in scale than Chernobyl. Any nuclear accident is catastrophic; thereby, the inclusion of initiatives to promote the plant's safety is vital in future peace talks concerning the war in Ukraine.
2. Mixed Feelings on Territorial Concessions: Zelensky and other Ukrainian government officials have expressed their desire for a full restoration of Ukraine's "1991 borders," referencing the borders of independent Ukraine after the fall of the USSR. In spite of that, Moscow has been adamant that the return of Kherson, Zaporizhzhya, Luhansk, and Donetsk oblasts is "non-negotiable". More importantly, continued Russian control of the ZNPP could serve as a valuable bargaining chip in future disputes with Ukraine.
3. Ceasefires are prone to violations and renewed violence: In hindsight, the Minsk agreements are seen as significant diplomatic failures. The agreements intended to create initiatives on security, humanitarian aspects, economy, and political issues. Under the OSCE-monitored peace, thousands of violations from both sides occurred, with the exact number remaining unknown. Most importantly, Ukraine has repeatedly expressed concerns that a ceasefire would allow Russia to rest and re-equip its forces for future operations, a recorded measure that Moscow took in the aftermath of the Minsk Agreements.
Most Plausible Scenario & Policy Recommendations
Scenario II represents the most viable because it encompasses a strategic middle ground between Ukrainian and Russian desires in a negotiation deal. Moreover, this scenario allows incremental but meaningful progress, leveraging existing framework while introducing essential changes to ensure the ZNPP’s safety. Most importantly, Scenario II is adaptable to the political and economic constraints caused by the war. For a successful implementation, a multi-pronged approach should be pursued.
1. Defining the Zone
A 20-25 km (approx. 12-15 mi) zone is established around the plant, demilitarized and patrolled by international peacekeepers under UN mandate.
○ Ensures zone is focused on the plant and the surrounding cities like Nikopol & Enerhodar (ideal places for centre of agreement’s operations).
The deployment or garrisoning of Russian or Ukrainian military assets within the zone is prohibited.
2. Security & Enforcement
UN peacekeepers composed of military personnel from non-NATO or Global South armed forces are deployed to prevent military incursions.
Ukraine and Russia each maintain a liaison office within the exclusion zone, reporting directly to the IAEA and UN.
Periodic Inspections by the IAEA, UN, or third party performed to ensure adherence to the agreement.
3. Long-Term Stability & Governance
IAEA as a Permanent Mediator: Given Russia’s control since March 2022, a complete return to Ukrainian authority is unlikely. Instead, a permanent IAEA oversight mechanism would remain in place to guarantee neutrality and prevent either side from using the plant as a geopolitical tool.
Bilateral Management Committee: A joint Russia-Ukraine-IAEA/UN governing body is established to oversee non-political, technical aspects of plant operation, ensuring both sides have input while preventing unilateral control.
Periodic Neutral Assessments: Every five years, the IAEA, with UN backing, assesses the stability of the exclusion zone and recommends adjustments based on security, operational integrity, and geopolitical developments.
Security Guarantees: Both Russia and Ukraine commit to non-interference in plant operations beyond their designated roles in the management committee, ensuring continued functionality without direct political disputes.
Conclusion
The fate of the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant remains a crucial factor in any future peace deal between Russia and Ukraine. Each proposed scenario—Russian control, an IAEA-administered exclusion zone, and a demilitarized joint oversight model—comes with significant challenges. While an internationally governed IAEA zone offers the best chance for stability, ensuring nuclear safety and reducing military escalation, it is not without flaws. The biggest risks include potential political gridlock, enforcement difficulties, and resistance from both Russia and Ukraine over sovereignty concerns.
Additionally, securing international peacekeepers presents another challenge, as many Global South nations may be reluctant to involve themselves in European affairs. However, utilizing troops from these countries remains the most viable option for providing security to the IAEA, ensuring a neutral mediating force between Ukraine and Russia, and adhering to Moscow’s firm rejection of Western peacekeepers in Ukraine. Without clear agreements and binding commitments, this approach could struggle to achieve lasting security.
For this plan to succeed, it must be backed by firm diplomatic commitments, precise enforcement mechanisms, and sustained international cooperation. Ukraine and Russia have deeply entrenched stakes in the plant, and any agreement must address these concerns to prevent future disputes. Stability in the region depends not only on resolving the status of ZNPP but also on carefully managing the broader geopolitical tensions. A poorly implemented solution could turn the ZNPP into another failed peace effort, similar to the Minsk Agreements. However, a well-structured, internationally supported resolution could establish a critical precedent for nuclear security in conflict zones. The outcome of this effort will serve as a test of global diplomacy to attain peace in Europe once again.