Is Türkiye Stronger after Syria and PKK “Victories”?
03/03/2025 - Written by Ozan A. Koyas
Introduction
Recent developments in the Middle East have poised Türkiye as a major regional power. Hot topics around Türkiye from its hard diplomatic and rhetorical stance against Israel’s involvement in Gaza, to the recent “victory” in Syria have been extensively covered by the media.
Yet it is important to understand the context of these developments, and how much they are actually making Türkiye a bigger player in the region. Afterall, Türkiye still faces high levels of political polarisation, decreasing government accountability and efficiency, as well as the still high levels of inflation.
When considering whether Türkiye shall become a bigger power, and a more stabilising force in the region, it is essential to consider whether these victories can really be utilised by Türkiye to truly exert its political and economic influence, and stabilise geopolitical tensions at home.
The Implication of Syrian “Victory”
In recent months, Türkiye has received major foreign policy victories the foremost being in Syria.
Despite not leading the charge and being more cautious before the rebel offensive, its military and political support for the Syrian oppositional forces such as the HTS and the SNA has paid off with the fall of the Assad Regime. Since then, Türkiye has been increasingly strengthening its economic and political ties with Syria’s interim government.
The influence has taken the shape of structuring future governmental structure of the new Syrian government, as well as the prospects of future economic initiatives, all to further Turkish power ambitions. The Turkish diplomatic mission in Syria plays a crucial role in applying this influence and shaping Türkiye to be a power-broker in the region, especially when Syria’s oppositional forces appear to be fragmented over Syria’s future governance. Afterall, Türkiye aims to reap the benefits of regime change in Syria.
Geopolitics and Refugees
It now has an increasing possibility of mitigating clashes with other Kurdish forces like the SDF outside of Turkish borders. There is a possibility for Türkiye to continue its work with neighbouring partners to oppose any further Kurdish opposition, and start establishing mediation frameworks with organisations which are moving towards PKK’s route.
As for the hundreds of thousands of Syrian refugees in Türkiye, they have been returning or planning to return to their homes since December. This can allow Erdoğan to possibly resolve the disputes in the last election with the domestic opposition in regards to the large number and presence of refugees.
Economic and Socio-Cultural
On the more economic side, Türkiye has already invested heavily to rebuild Syria, with an increase in Turkish exports to Syria and further developments for aiding Syria’s banking and power sectors, among others which need desperate re-establishment after the devastation from the Syrian civil war.
This follows comments from major Turkish industry leaders to ameliorate Syria’s transportation infrastructure and energy sector from previous months. One such previous example has been Türkiye’s Karpowership providing electricity to Syria from December 2024. Further, there is a cultural influence as well with plans to build a more durable peace in Syria, and offering educational opportunities for Syrians in Turkish universities.
Yet, it is important to remember that these developments do not fully indicate a complete investment by Türkiye to fully redevelop Syria. Gulf states are also planning to intervene as well, albeit Western actors currently hesitant due to their terrorist policy stance against the HTS. Moreover, it will be very difficult for Syria to fully recover economically as many people, even in more densely populated areas, still live on short supplies of electricity and lack cash flow - inhibiting growth.
Regional Players
In regards to other big players in the region, such a development marks the already growing trend of Türkiye becoming a more influential regional player outmanoeuvring Russia and Iran. The collapse of Assad’s regime is strategically “a blow to Iran and Russia – and a boost for Turkey.”
Those two powers had propped up Assad; their influence in Syria now wanes as Türkiye’s allies fill the vacuum. Ankara finds itself with “essential levers of influence” in Damascus and thus holds greater sway than Moscow or Tehran over Syria’s future. Such a development could alter Türkiye’s 360 degree policy outlook, with a potential rapprochement with the West.
Implication of PKK “Victory”
After more than 40 years of conflict, the PKK Leader Abdullah Öcalan has called for the PKK to dissolve, stating that the idea of Kurdish nationalism in Türkiye futile and will not materialise, as the rights of Kurds in the country has improved and that the aims and objectives of the PKK belong in the 20th century. Following Öcalan’s statement, the PKK agreed to hold a ceasefire and halt aggressions, unless they were provoked by Turkish forces.
Öcalan’s statement and the PKK ceasefire could indicate a start to ameliorating Türkiye’s relations with those Kurdish groups, albeit more difficult with other Kurdish groups outside the PKK remit. Shortcomings to actually resolving the Kurdish issue for Türkiye still exist, but this is a major development with enormous implications on Turkish domestic stability and regional relations with other Kurdish movements.
Historical Significance
This is quite a significant development since the PKK was founded in 1984 under the ambition to fight against the Turkish state and carve out Southeastern Türkiye for itself. They have long collaborated with Kurdish groups in adjacent countries to undermine and oppose Turkish advances in Syria and Iraq, while combating ISIS during 2014-2018. Yet the PKK started to wane down its influence after 2018, with a major decrease in attacks against civilians and shifting focus into undermining Turkish influence in its Southeastern provinces, and neighbouring Syria and Iraq.
However, the PKK’s attacks most likely decreased overtime as a result of a heavy loss in their own militants and an inability to effectively fight against the more powerful Turkish military. If Öcalan’s statement is actually followed by members of the PKK, it would be a major blow for Kurdish independence movements in the region. It seems that the PKK might decide to shift its advocacy strategies to less violent means, which can apply pressure to other movements who are using violent means.
Domestic Implication in Türkiye
Domestically, the use of the PKK as a national security issue will most likely no longer work. It is important to understand that the PKK in Turkish media and state’s policy stances have always been portrayed as a way to justify Turkish military engagements in ‘troublesome’ remote parts of Türkiye, especially after terror acts instigated by the group. Though Türkiye can shift the narrative towards more indirect repressive manners, the disappearance of the PKK from major national security issues could likely drive the moment for the rights of Kurds. So, it’s now an opportunity for Erdoğan to redeem himself from “betraying” the Kurds in 2015, and potentially ameliorate his chances of winning the next Turkish elections.
As for the status of Kurdish rights within Türkiye, more is required for Kurdish political parties like the HDP to not be threatened by Turkish security forces, and improve the social and cultural protection of the Kurdish identity within Turkish society. The expectation from Öcalan’s statement is thus an improvement in Türkiye’s democratic institutions and the protection of the Kurdish identity to prevent any future violent movements to build against Türkiye.
Regional Implication
More regionally, the negotiation process that Türkiye took alongside the DEM party to broker the PKK deal could be utilised to potentially begin negotiations with other Kurdish groups. However, Türkiye currently struggles with even bringing down PKK involvement with other Kurdish groups in Syria and Iraq. The reason for this advance most likely results from the still on-going fighting with Turkish forces against other oppositional Kurdish movements in Syria. Such tensions manifest themselves currently over the Kurdish SDF and YPG’s autonomy status in Syria, which Türkiye does not want to see manifest itself into a call for direct independence.
Do these developments make Türkiye stronger?
While there is prospective optimism, the uncertainty over these recent “victories,” as well as continued domestic economic and political constraints make it difficult to definitely state that Türkiye is becoming more stable and powerful in the region. Additionally, Russia and Iran’s losses in Syria have not necessarily made them completely withdraw their interests from the region. Other external actors, such as Israel’s recent land grabs in the Golan Heights will cause further instability. Economic support from Western powers and the ending of sanctions are crucial for Syria to improve, and for Türkiye to aid Syria’s new regime and improve its economic prospects. Overall, Türkiye has found itself in a favourable position - however, there still remains much work in reconstructing Syria and maintaining this influence long-term against other regional players, whom Türkiye may come into conflict with, such as Israel.
High uncertainty over victory outcomes
Syria continues to have a fragmented political front in deciding how the regime should govern.
Dependency on lifting sanctions against Syria to ensure Syria rebuilds, and Turkish investments increase in value.
PKK has not yet decided to disband across all countries in the region, and other Kurdish groups in Syria are right now most unlikely to follow suit.
Türkiye’s political constraints
High levels of political polarisation still divide the country and make it difficult for political stability.
Erdoğan’s AKP has caused the country to become more autocratic, thus making it uncertain how Kurdish rights are to improve in the country. The crackdowns and repression of domestic political forces like the HDP has been a historic example.
Türkiye’s economic constraints
Türkiye’s ability to invest into Syria and be resilient economically is still weak, despite lowered inflation, improved credit ratings, and current moderate levels of GDP growth.
Türkiye’s lira is still heavily devalued; inflation, interest rates, and public debt are still high, and high dependence on imports.
Russia and Iran
Türkiye is a crucial actor for Russia in keeping any influence in the Middle East, as the loss of Syria has meant a major loss to Russian military influence.
Iran’s influence wanes down since the downing of Hezbollah, and Assad in Syria, with an upper-hand given to Türkiye.
Israel
Since Assad has fallen, Israel has made territorial advances across the Golan Heights.
Tensions potentially increase as Türkiye competes with Israel, and builds on existing tension over Gaza. Since October 7th, and especially since last summer, Türkiye has made somewhat provocative statements against Israel.
As Iranian forces have fallen back, Israel sees the growing Turkish influence in the region as a threat.
US and EU
Türkiye to potentially improve diplomatic relations with the West as Erdoğan welcomed EU removal of some Syrian sanctions.
Yet Türkiye still adopting the 360 foreign policy, and thus still is under diplomatic strains with the West as it still advocates joining BRICS.
The US and EU are mainly uncertain about lifting sanctions due to Syria’s political fragmentation.