The Collapse of Serbian Stabilitocracy: A Domestic Crisis and Its Geopolitical Fallout
26/02/2025 - Written by Maciej Grzech
Introduction
Sunday, February 9th marked 100 days since the collapse of a train station in Novi Sad, a disaster that has become a symbol of deepening discontent in Serbia. The protests on this symbolic date are not an isolated event, rather they are a part of sustained anti-regime demonstrations that have paralyzed the country since the incident. The student-led protests reflect a deep dissatisfaction with President Aleksandar Vucic’s leadership, connecting the fatal disaster to corruption practices and governance failures of the incumbents.
The domestic pressures transcend the borders of Serbia, carrying immediate geopolitical implications. The protests place Serbia at the center of a contest between two competing influences; EU and its declared normative commitment to democratic enlargement, and Russia, which maintains deep influence among Serbia’s pro-Moscow factions. As Vucic’s legitimacy declines, the risk of regional destabilizing spillovers grows. Here’s why.
Student Protests – The Most Significant Challenge to Vucic’s Rule
On 1 November 2024, a freshly reconstructed railway station in Novi Sad collapsed. The incident killed 15 people, including 14 Serbian citizens and one Macedonian. The investigation of the disaster captured the substantial government corruption and negligence that led up to this event. In an attempt to ease the public discontent, several high-profile officials resigned, including the Construction Minister Goran Vesic, and more recently, Prime Minister Milos Vucevic. However, the concessions from the Serbian government have only intensified the mass demonstrations as the participants realize the tangible results of their protests.
Whilst Vucic has faced domestic unrest throughout his tenure, notably in 2017, 2018, 2020, and 2023, he consistently relied on effective intimidation tactics and police suppression to contain dissent. Yet, his strategies of maintaining civil order may no longer be viable due to the scale of the recent mobilization. The current wave of protests demonstrates unity in opposition not seen in Serbia since the ‘’October 5 Revolution’’ in 2000, when former President Milosevic was overthrown. Recent polls indicate that approximately 2/3 of the population are supportive of the movements. Whilst the train incident acted as a trigger event, the protests are an accumulation of Serb frustration with Vucic’s government, particularly in relation to limitations in media freedom, organized crime and employment of repressive mechanisms.
These developments reflect a broader trend of democratic backsliding under Vucic. The Serbian state is increasingly displaying authoritarian tendencies, with an ineffective rule of law, violence against political opponents and failing electoral system. Given this trend, Freedom House has classified Serbia as a ‘’transitional’’ or ‘’hybrid’’ regime in its 2024 report - a clear departure from the democratic trajectory prior to Vucic’s ruling with Serbian Progressive Party (SPP). The protests are hence not only symbolic of the dissatisfaction with the incumbents but display a wider struggle of restoring coherent democratic governance in Serbia.
Vucic’s ‘’Chameleon’’ Foreign Policy
Vucic has adopted a unique approach to international affairs. His foreign policy of strategic hedging is a balancing approach, seeking to form effective relations with the West, Russia and to some extent, China. This approach has been effective so far for Belgrade. Its partnerships with the West have brought substantial economic wealth and sustained domestic growth. The economic gains emerging from the relationship are demonstrated by the deal agreed on a lithium mining project with German Chancellor Scholz, and Belgrade’s continued ammunition supply to Ukraine through third parties which now amount to €800 million since 2022. Russia is viewed as an important economic partner, particularly within energy. Nevertheless, its deeper significance is rooted in ideological alignment of illiberal governance, historical Orthodox roots, and its continued support for Serbia’s claims over Kosovo.
Despite domestic protests in the past, these international forces have historically displayed an unwavering commitment to Vucic’s regime, allowing him to consolidate power while avoiding serious external repercussions. The EU's complicity within this democratic regression has been central; it displayed a selective application of its proclaimed normative principles. Whilst the EU continues to present itself as the moral model for states seeking accession to the union, supporting pro-democratic movements in Georgia and Moldova - it has for years turned a blind eye to Serbia’s growing illiberalism. The consequence of this policy is most evident today.
EU and Stabilitocracy
The European Union’s approach to Serbia under Vucic, and its acceptance towards growing authoritarianism can be understood through EU’s conceptualization of the Balkan region. The EU perceives the Balkans as a region historically characterized by ethnic tensions, political instability and fragile statehood. In this sense, stability is seen as a foundational prerequisite for any democratic reform in the region. The union has thus tolerated the ‘’stabilitocracy’’, a regime model under Vucic, which despite its democratic shortcomings, has offered relative stability. This is most closely captured by the EU’s portrayal of President Vucic, actively endorsing him as the adequate figure to progress and overcome the ‘’Kosovo Issue’’ - mutual recognition.
The belief rooted within the EU, is that overcoming this ‘’Kosovo Issue’’, unlocks an unlimited realm of possibilities for Serbia, Kosovo, and the EU. The normalisation of relations between the two states is seen as the key condition for Serbia’s potential accession to the European Union. The EU considers the resolution of this dispute as not only ensuring political stability, but equally long-term prosperity in the region. By addressing this issue, the EU envisions a path towards a unified and thriving market in the Balkans, integrated into the European economic and regulatory framework.
Key Players and Stakeholders
Serbia
Whilst taking accountability for the tragedy, the protests have been framed by Vucic as foreign interference. This ideological proclamation largely mirrors Russia’s portrayal of Colour Revolutions as Western-orchestrated destabilization efforts.
Vucic’s domestic legitimacy is excessively low. Lack of any popular support renders strategies such as repression as only accelerating the collapse of his government. The President must find a ground to unify the population.
Vucic has suggested holding snap elections in April, but this does not ease the pressure, the opposition demands an interim government.
EU
The EU has remained notably silent on the protests for an extended period, raising questions about its stance. However, on February 11th, Marta Kos, the European Commissioner for Enlargement, delivered a speech on the ‘’Political Crisis in Serbia’’. Whilst acknowledging concerns over the authorities' treatment of civil society and the violent nature of the protests, the speech does not signal a shift in EU’s policy. It continues to view the current regime as the key actor in addressing these issues, emphasising Serbia’s leadership's continued commitment to democratic reforms over the years.
The ongoing protests, and the respective regional instability they are anticipated to bring, question the fundamental premise of EU’s stabilitocracy strategy. The assumption that erosion of democratic standards can be overlooked in exchange for regional stability is no longer guaranteed.
The protests may force the EU to re-evaluate its long-term strategy in Serbia.
Russia
Russian Foreign Ministry spokeswoman Maria Zakharova has warned that Serbia faces a risk of descending into ‘’chaos’’. The protests are portrayed as an existential threat to the regime.
Russia’s financial commitment in Ukraine captures the threat of overextension. Russia’s limited ability to financially support its allies is seen in the fall of the Assad regime. This resource constraint may reduce economic and political backing for Serbia during the period of crisis.
Russia is increasingly dissatisfied with the status quo of its partnership with Serbia. Recently Serbia has played a part in sanctioning a Serbian-based NIS, an energy company in which Russia holds a 56% share. These developments are testing Kremlin’s patience.
Amid instability, Russia may seek to exert its influence to install a more explicitly pro-Moscow leadership. With 47.7% Serbs viewing Russia as their most important foreign policy partner, Moscow has a significant room for manoeuvre.
Kosovo
If Prime Minister Albin Kurti successfully forms a majority coalition, his re-election would further solidify Kosovo’s firm stance against Serbia. His leadership has been characterized by a strong nationalist approach, and a refusal to make concessions to Belgrade.
Kurti has emphasised his control over more Kosovan territory than any previous leader since independence in 2008. His policies reflect an attempt to reduce Serb control within Kosovo, banning dinar transfers from Serbia to Kosovo’s ethnic Serb minority that depends on Belgrade social services.
Serbian internal instability presents an opportunity for Kosovo to strengthen its institutions in areas where Belgrade has historically exerted influence. There is a growing possibility that Kosovo will move to assert greater administrative and security control in those regions.
Opportunities and Risks
Opportunities:
Institutional and Regulatory Cooperation
The protests demonstrate EU’s ineffective scrutiny of Serbia’s institutions, despite the €692,6 million commitment through the Instrument for Pre-Accession Assistance (IPA), between 2014-2020, directed at the improvement of democracy and rule of law in Serbia. The turmoil presents a unique opportunity for the EU to reset its approach to institutional and regulatory cooperation with Serbia. The union must move beyond reliance on broad short-term funding for democratic programmes, and begin implementing long-term institutional strengthening. The EU Twinning programme could be vital within this. Pairing Serbian institutions with EU counterparts will provide effective support for democratic transformation.
Intensify EU R&D Funding
Serbia has already engaged in EU’s Research and Innovation programmes and made notable progress. Horizon Europe is one of the funding schemes available to Serbia. The EU should intensify its support, specifically increasing funding to sectors like green energy and digital transformation. This would mark a deeper alignment with the EU regarding its sustainability and digital transition goals. These reforms would promote normative convergence, reinforcing Serbia’s integration into the EU framework, whilst indirectly pushing for reforms demanded by protesters.
Fostering Cultural Exchange Programmes
Increasing the funding pool for programmes such as Erasmus+, an exchange programme for university students could be vital. This approach avoids drastic destabilization or overt ‘’interference’’, while reinforcing the pro-European sentiment already displayed by large segments of the younger generations. Strengthening these ties can counterbalance Russian propaganda, which seeks to provide alternative conceptions of the social order. Such programmes have been a historic success in shaping democratic outlooks, evidenced in US cultural diplomacy attempts during the Cold War.
Risks:
Increasing Nationalist Rhetoric
Given the domestic instability, Vucic is likely to intensify the nationalist rhetoric around Kosovo as means of consolidating his base. He has previously expressed admiration for Azerbaijan’s President Ilham Aliyev, specifically his handling of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, and the region’s politicised nature to reinforce Aliyev’s grip on power. Similarly, Vucic has repeatedly played the ‘’Kosovo Card’’, employing Kosovo as a means to mobilise nationalist support and distract from internal crises.
Regional Spillovers
The combination of domestic turmoil and intensifying nationalist rhetoric could embolden extremist Serb factions to undertake attacks in the region. Attacks resembling Banjska 2023 could take place, particularly in contested regions such as northern Kosovo, Montenegro, and Republika Srpska in Bosnia and Herzegovina. This escalation would drastically destabilise the Balkans.
Expansion of organized crime networks
Under Vucic, the organized crime networks have thrived, often benefiting from state protection. Periods of domestic instability, when government resources are primarily directed at enforcement and suppressing protests, creates a clear opening for these networks to expand their operations.
Intensification of Pro-Moscow influence
Since Putin’s re-election in 2012, Russia has actively engaged in an informational war in Europe. In Serbia, where pro-Moscow factions are already strong, Russian propaganda is likely to be even more effective given the rising dissatisfaction with Vucic’s government. This could further polarize Serbian society and complicate Serbia's commitment to the EU accession process.
Policy Recommendations
The EU must offer its regulatory and institutional expertise to Serbia to tackle the fundamental issues of accountability and corruption within the Serbian government. This approach must be politically neutral, aimed to empower and strengthen institutions, rather than protecting the entrenched interests of the Serbian elite. If the EU truly sees Serbia as a potential candidate to join the union, it must take these institutional concerns very seriously.
The EU should deviate from its established strategy of ‘’stabilitocracy’’ as Vucic’s government no longer offers the stability required in the region. The protests could be recognized as pro-democratic forces requesting broader institutional reforms. This is a real opportunity for the EU to support genuine democratization in Serbia. Whilst the protests lack EU flags, this should not be misinterpreted as opposition to European democratic values. Rather, the protestors perceive the EU as aligned with the regime that they seek to dismantle.
Consequently, the EU should offer a democratic push to the protests. This must not take the form of financial backing to the organisations on the ground. Such a strategy would only validate Vucic’s narrative of protests being a ‘’foreign interference’’, delegitimizing the reform demands from the population. Instead, the EU should prioritise political support through issuing a coherent, and consistent criticism of the regime’s actions. This clear political stance would reconceptualize the EU's role in Serbia - from a status quo actor to a pro-democratic ally of the civil society.