Suomettuminen (Finlandization) to NATO: Breaking Point or Inevitable Shift?
11/03/20225 - Written by Jake Southerland
Introduction
The sounds of the Finnish anthem, Maamme, echo as the national flag is hoisted at NATO headquarters in April 2023, with many international media outlets declaring this a historic moment for European security as the "end of Finland's long-term neutrality," "the end of Nordic neutrality," or variations of these phrases (Caifero 2023; Hahimäki 2024). However, this media narrative oversimplifies Finland's complex history of geopolitical manoeuvring. Finland has been caught in a geopolitical tug-of-war between Russia and Western powers for decades, a precarious position that has characterised its pragmatic approach to foreign policy. This report reassesses Finland's historical approach to neutrality from World War II to the contemporary era to determine if Finland's NATO ascension signifies a fundamental shift in its security policy or is the logical outcome of a long-standing Western alignment.
When discussing neutrality in international relations, it is essential to reference The Hague Conference of 1907, which established its modern legal foundations (Aguis & Devine 2011). However, in this report, neutrality is framed in the Cold War context, referring to the non-participation in military alliances, as exemplified by Austria and Yugoslavia. This definition remains relevant today, as European states like Switzerland remain outside military alliances. This report employs historical, conceptual analysis to determine whether Finnish neutrality ended in 2022 with its NATO application or had already eroded decades earlier. Additionally, it explores the risks and opportunities presented by Finland's NATO membership and how Helsinki should navigate its new geopolitical position.
Historical Analysis
In its early years of independence, Finland's leader, Carl Gustaf Mannerheim, opposed alliances with the Baltic States and Poland, fearing they would provoke the Bolshevik government in Moscow, which was reclaiming former Tsarist territories such as Ukraine and Georgia. In the 1930s, Finland sought to create a "zone of neutrality" with its Nordic neighbours, but this effort failed following the Winter War (1939–40) and Germany's occupation of Denmark and Norway. World War II forced Finland into a strategic alliance with Nazi Germany to defend its sovereignty. During the Continuation War (1941–1944), Finland fought alongside Germany against the Soviet Union but never formally joined the Axis Powers and avoided hostilities with the Western Allies. By 1944, Finland was forced to negotiate peace with the USSR to prevent Soviet occupation after multiple Red Army breakthroughs.
The following 40 years of Finnish security policy were determined by the YYA Treaty (1948), which obligated Helsinki to consult Moscow on significant foreign and security matters at the Soviets' request. While Finlandization was seen as a form of Soviet appeasement, some, including French political scientist Raymond Aron, went as far as labelling Finland a Soviet "puppet" or "semi-independent state" (Aunesluoma & Rainio-Niemi 2016).
However, unlike the Baltic States, Finland retained control of its military and forbade Soviet troop garrisons on its soil. While outwardly adhering to neutrality, Finland modernised its military with Western technology, ensuring it could maintain an independent deterrence capability (Forsberg & Pesu 2016). Finland also fortified its eastern border and structured its defence to counter potential Soviet aggression rather than aligning with Soviet military doctrine (Hakovirta 1978). Helsinki deepened cooperation with Nordic countries, particularly Sweden, which had close NATO ties, creating informal security links to the West. Most notably, Finnish intelligence services covertly exchanged information with Western states, demonstrating its quiet security alignment with NATO states while publicly maintaining neutrality (Forsberg & Pesu 2016). Despite mistrust toward the Soviets, Finland's geopolitical situation drastically changed in 1991 with the collapse of the USSR.
Following the Soviet Union's collapse, Finland's security policy shifted further toward Western integration while officially maintaining military non-alignment. Finland became an official NATO partner in 1994, marking its first formal cooperation with the alliance (Chatterjee 2023). Finland joined the European Union a year later, strengthening its economic, political, and security ties with the West. Throughout the 2000s, Finland enhanced security cooperation with the US, EU, and Nordic states and co-founded NORDEFCO, a Nordic military cooperation framework. Despite these moves, Finland still sought to maintain a constructive dialogue with Russia, which appeared to be pursuing normalization with the West.
Russia's invasion of Georgia in 2008 was a shock to Finland, but the annexation of Crimea in 2014 marked a significant turning point in Finnish security policy. In response, Helsinki reinforced its defence partnerships with NATO and the EU, reflecting growing concerns over Russian aggression. However, support for NATO membership remained low, with only around 20 percent of Finns favoring membership (Forsberg 2024). The full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022 marked the final shift in Finland's security approach. In response, Finland supplied weapons to Ukraine and submitted its NATO application. Historically, Finland has navigated geopolitical struggles, first between Nazi Germany and the USSR, then between the US and USSR, and now between Russia and the West. Its NATO membership is the culmination of this long-standing strategic shift.
Breaking Point or Inevitable Shift?
While international media correctly states that Finnish neutrality officially ended with NATO accession in 2023, this view oversimplifies history. As demonstrated in this analysis, true Finnish neutrality ended with the collapse of the USSR in 1991. This historical context is crucial to understanding Finland's NATO accession, which was not a sudden shift but a culmination of decades-long strategic adjustments toward the West. By understanding this historical context, IR students and professionals can better appreciate the reasons behind Finland's decision to join NATO.
While Putin's invasion of Ukraine was a catalyst for Finland's decision to join NATO, it was not the sole reason. The war removed any doubts about Russia's respect for national sovereignty, transforming NATO membership from a reactive decision into a strategic necessity. Furthermore, the historical pattern of Russo-Finnish relations suggests that Finland's NATO membership will likely provoke Russia to take measures that they believe will hinder Finnish interests. These measures could range from prolonged diplomatic tensions to potential hybrid warfare, all of which Finland must be prepared to defend against as it integrates into the alliance.
The debate over the history of neutrality remains a complex issue in Finnish society, but the focus of international relations must now shift to Finland's future within NATO, particularly in an era of geopolitical uncertainty. As Finland navigates its new position in today's security landscape, its relationships with Russia, Sweden, NATO, and the EU will be pivotal in shaping Europe's future defense strategy.
Key Players & Stakeholders
Finland: Finland's decision to join NATO alludes to historical security concerns regarding Russia. Finland has sought to preserve its sovereignty throughout its modern history, first from Soviet influence and later from Russian assertiveness. Its well-trained, conscription-based army, which adds significant strength to NATO's northern defenses, will play a crucial role in deterring potential threats. Moving forward, Finland's ability to integrate seamlessly into NATO operations will be crucial for regional security in Northern Europe.
Russia: Historically, Russia has attempted to maintain influence over Finland from the Tsarist era to Soviet control under the YYA Treaty. Finland's NATO accession represents a significant failure in Moscow's attempts to prevent alliance expansion. As NATO bolsters its northern defenses, Russia will continue to view Finland's membership as a direct threat, significantly shaping future geopolitical tensions.
Sweden: Sweden's historical ties to Finland remain vital to both nations' security strategies. Sweden played a supportive role during Finland's wars with the Soviet Union and followed a parallel path of neutrality throughout the Cold War. By jointly applying for NATO membership, Sweden and Finland reinforce their long-standing security cooperation, making them key actors in shaping NATO's northern defensive strategy.
NATO/EU: Finland's integration into NATO strengthens the alliance's capabilities in the Arctic and Baltic regions. Since joining NATO's Partnership for Peace in 1994 and the EU in 1995, Finland has played an active role in Western security. Moving forward, NATO and the EU must work closely with Finland to ensure smooth operational integration and develop collective deterrence strategies that address the challenges posed by Russia's military posture in the region.
Opportunities and Risks
Opportunities:
Strengthening regional security within NATO: Finland's accession to NATO enhances the alliance's strategic posture in the High North, bolstering collective defense mechanisms and deterring potential adversaries (Wieslander 2024).
Improvements in defense interoperability between Finnish and NATO forces: Finland's integration into NATO facilitates enhanced joint training exercises, intelligence sharing, and operational coordination, strengthening the alliance's overall military effectiveness (Berquist, Heisbourg, Nyberg, and Tiilikainen 2016).
Expansion of deterrence mechanisms against Russian threats: By joining NATO, Finland benefits from the alliance's collective defense commitments, thereby enhancing its deterrence posture against potential Russian aggression (Rynning 2024)
Risks
Heightened geopolitical tensions between Russia and NATO: Russia perceives Finland's NATO membership as a strategic encroachment, potentially escalating military tensions and destabilising the broader regional security environment (Logan and Friedman 2022).
Economic repercussions due to reduced trade with Russia: The deterioration of Finland-Russia relations following NATO accession could lead to significant economic challenges for Finland, particularly in sectors heavily reliant on Russian markets (Svenska Dagbladet 2022).
Risk of being drawn into a broader NATO-Russia conflict: As a NATO member, Finland is obligated to participate in collective defence operations, which could entangle the country in future conflicts involving the alliance and Russia (Sweeney 2022).
Policy Recommendations
1. Strengthen Cyber and Hybrid Warfare Defense: Russia's hybrid warfare strategy, dictated by the Primakov/Gerasimov Doctrine (abbreviated as PG), emphasizes a mixed approach of conventional military operations, cyberattacks, and disinformation campaigns to destabilise adversaries (Hutchings 2018). Since joining NATO, Finland has rapidly improved its cyber defence initiatives, hosted the NATO Hybrid Symposium, and invested in cyber resilience programs (NATO 2023). However, continued cyberattacks and misinformation campaigns against Finland convey that further investments in advanced cyber monitoring and rapid response capabilities are necessary to effectively counter Russia's hybrid threats (Ålander 2024).
2. Diversify Energy Partnerships: The PG Doctrine emphasises the reliance on Russian energy exports on the international stage as a geopolitical tool to exert influence. Once notoriously reliant on Russian energy, Finland has reduced its dependence on Moscow for energy by expanding its energy projects and diversifying supply chains (Luoma and Kauranen 2024). However, additional investments in nuclear energy, LNG terminals, and greater interconnectivity with European grids are crucial steps towards long-term energy security and reducing the risk of economic coercion from Moscow.
3. Enhance Regional Cooperation: With Russia's evident military posturing within the last decade, strengthening regional defense cooperation is vital. Finland's participation in NATO's Steadfast Defender exercise and growing military cooperation with its Nordic neighbors reinforces its commitment to regional security (Beale 2024). Continued integration into joint Nordic defense initiatives and continued collaboration with the Baltic states would significantly enhance NATO capabilities in the Baltic region and significantly deter Russian military assets in Kaliningrad and Finnish border regions (Friis 2024).
Conclusion
Finland's NATO accession was not an abrupt departure from neutrality but the culmination of decades of gradual integration into Western security frameworks. Since the end of the Cold War, Finland has systematically strengthened its Western ties by joining the EU in 1995 and becoming an official NATO partner in 1994. While international media framed NATO membership as the end of neutrality, this analysis demonstrates that Finland's shift began long before its 2022 application. The collapse of the USSR in 1991 was the key event that allowed Finland to pursue deeper security cooperation without Soviet constraints.
Finland's role in NATO will be crucial in strengthening the alliance's northern flank. Its strategic geographic position makes it a key player in NATO's deterrence strategy against potential Russian aggression. However, Helsinki must also navigate new geopolitical uncertainties, particularly in light of shifting US foreign policy, as President Trump's suspending American aid to Ukraine will significantly impact NATO's cohesion (Banco, Hunder, and Harmash 2025). Finland's advanced military capabilities provide a critical boost to NATO's collective defence, but it must continue to integrate into NATO operations. To ensure long-term regional stability, Finland must continue strengthening regional cooperation, enhancing cyber resilience, and reinforcing its defence posture against Putin’s Russia.