Türkiye’s Reconstruction of and Influence in Post-Assad Syria
04 January 2025 - Written by Tarik Ata
Key takeaways:
Türkiye is the new power broker in Syria, and a regional power dynamic shift has occurred. Placing Ankara as the “key” to the new Syria.
Iran has suffered a significant blow. Tehran, now in the eyes of their allies, will be perceived as weak. Tehran has lost its land bridge to “axis of resistance” allies Hezbollah, who need to rebuild after Israel’s bombardment of them but will struggle without Iran’s support via the land bridge (but there are still possibilities of the land bridge remaining intact somewhat as there are still Iranian networks in Syria).
Russia prioritised Ukraine and will pivot its naval operations in the Mediterranean to its military locations in Libya. Anticipate greater levels of engagement between Russia and Libya, which also serves as a base of Moscow’s operations in the Sahel region.
Introduction
Last month Syrian rebel groups brought down the Ba’athist Party, and Bashar al-Assad’s decades-long tenure came to a crashing end. As the month passed, it became increasingly apparent, the significant role that Türkiye held in the collapse of the Assad government and its power in the state's future direction. Ankara’s support for organisations such as Hayat al-Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) and Syrian National Army (SNA) - which has been described as an auxiliary army of the Turkish Armed Forces due to the SNA being deployed in other conflicts in the South Caucasus and Libya - has granted Türkiye a leading role in the trajectory and future development of Damascus. But with this support comes opportunity and risks, not only for military and intelligence expansion but also for laying the foundations for Ankara’s future role and influence in Damascus for decades.
Contextual analysis
Türkiye has long been engaged in covert and overt operations for sway and influence in Syria, as Ankara does in most of its former Ottoman territories. For instance, not long after the Turkish Republic was formed, the region of Hatay, then part of French-mandated Syria (now south-eastern Türkiye), was annexed by Ankara in 1939 - fueling Arab nationalism and anti-Turkish sentiment amongst Arab populations in the region.
Turkish officials refused recognition of an independent Syrian state in 1946. Still, Türkiye’s good relations with neighbouring states at the time (Iraq & Jordan - the Hashemite Arab Kingdoms) led Damascus not to pursue a staunch nationalist sentiment against Ankara. Post-independent Syria, which was politically fragmented, offered a prime opportunity for Turkish operatives to engage in minor operations to sway public opinion on Türkiye.
One such example is the formation of a foundation named ‘ŞARK’, by Said Haydar Bey, a Syrian political exile who resided in Türkiye and was considered a Turcophile by Ankara and deemed a suitable individual to run their front organisation. In short, this institution sought to influence Syrian political elites, gather intelligence on cabinet members' opinions on Ankara, and influence the views and opinions of the Syrian population on Türkiye.
Later, in 1957, the US ambassador to Ankara, Fletcher Warren, interrupted a cabinet meeting to prevent the Turkish Prime Minister Adnan Menderes from invading Syria to put down the communist threat in Damascus. Warren was cautious of the potential power Ankara could gain from dominating such a geographically strategic location - enabling it to, if Ankara wished, disrupt the flow of oil to Western states.
More recently, Damascus has remained a constant site of interest for Ankara. From the breakout of the protests in Syria against Assad in 2011 and the brutal crackdown on them, Ankara has consistently called for the resignation of Assad. Türkiye has not only called on Assad’s resignation but actively worked towards his overthrow (as we have seen culminate more recently). From the start of the Syrian Civil War, Turkish military and intelligence assisted and trained Syrian Army (Assad’s state military) defectors that would eventually form the Free Syrian Army (FSA), which would later be renamed in 2017 to the SNA. This assistance would develop over the years to Türkiye’s National Intelligence Organisation (MİT) arming the FSA and providing them with bases for operations. The Turkish Armed Forces and allied Syrian opposition rebel groups conducted operations in Northern Syria in 2016, ‘Operation Euphrates Shield’, and in 2018, ‘Operation Olive Branch’. Both operations saw Türkiye and allied forces engaged in conflicts against Islamic State (IS) as well as the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), which Ankara views as an extension of the designated terrorist group, the Kurdistan Worker’s Party (PKK).
It goes without saying, Syria has remained a primary concern for Ankara and consistently played a central role in its regional foreign policy decisions.
Reconstruction of the Post-Assad Syria
The reconstruction of Syria will cost an estimated $400 billion, and the developments so far have indicated that Syria will largely be rebuilt by the Turkish government and Turkish companies, with the future foundations of government institutions being formed with assistance from Ankara.
In the early stages of Assad’s overthrow, the shares of Turkish construction and cement companies surged as it was expected, based on the comments of Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan, that Türkiye would play a crucial role in rebuilding the war-torn country. Due to Türkiye’s proximity to Syria, sharing an almost 1,000 km border with Türkiye, Turkish companies have an edge in trade relations. Furthermore, Türkiye is a world leader in the cement sector (ranked fifth on the world stage). On its doorstep, a logistical advantage, it is a nation that needs to be rebuilt and demands high quantities of cement for reconstruction. In terms of the steel sector, Türkiye is the eighth largest producer of steel in the world, once again providing major opportunities for Turkish companies in Syria’s reconstruction.
Ankara’s role in Syria’s reconstruction is also seen in the proposed construction of critical infrastructure, such as rebuilding railway architecture, including the famous Hejaz railway. The Turkish Transportation Minister, Minister Abdulkadir Uraloglu, stated recently that Ankara will restore parts of the historic Hejaz railway, connecting Istanbul to Damascus, with the help of the new government of Syria. The development of other critical infrastructure, such as the electrical grid, has been noted by the Turkish Energy Minister, Alparslan Bayraktar. Ankara has made it clear that experts from Turkish-state-owned companies, such as the Electricity Generation Company (EUAS) and the Turkish Electricity Transmission Corporation (TEIAS), will survey Syria’s energy infrastructure and develop solutions to the frequent power outages. This will result in Turkish technicians remaining in Syria for long durations to ensure the grid runs effectively.
Moreover, according to Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan, not only will the material reconstruction of infrastructure in Syria be aided by Ankara, but so will the new political processes and institutions. Türkiye will work with HTS leader and the de-facto leader of Syria, Ahmed al-Sharaa (commonly known as Abu Mohammad al-Jolani), to draft a new constitution and build a political system. Erdogan also stressed the urgent need to rebuild Syria and then to repatriate Syrian refugees to quel domestic anti-refugee rhetoric.
It has also been suggested that Ankara will rebuild Syria’s demolished military to potentially fill the void left by Iran and Russia. Türkiye will also providing military training and pursue defence and security agreements, further consolidating control of a future established Syrian state. Damascus becoming apart of Ankara’s military architecture will place Türkiye in a prime position not only in Syria but also in the Arab-Israeli peacemaking process. We are likely to see a Turkish contingent in the Golan Heights or military liaison of sorts to back up UN missions and serving as a facilitator between Israeli and Syrian leaders. This would place President Erdoğan in an established role within the negotiations concerning Gaza and Lebanon - realising his neo-ottoman aspirations.
We can see Türkiye’s importance unfolding as the newly forming Syrian government has appointed Esaad Hasan Shinabi, a Turkish-educated refugee seeking asylum in Türkiye with his family for over a decade, as the new Foreign Minister. These deep relationships with Ankara will enable Türkiye to reap many fruitful rewards in the years to come.
Most recently, Western governments have engaged with the de-facto leader Ahmed al-Sharaa. The British initiated talks with the new leader of Damascus in mid-December, swiftly followed by a £50 million aid package. Meanwhile, other Western nations, such as France and Germany, sent their foreign ministers (Jean-Noel Barrot & Annalena Baerbock) to meet Syria’s de-facto rulers - the first such move by top European officials. These are signals of Europe seeking to open government channels with HTS and still debating whether to remove HTS as a designated terrorist organisation.
Key players and stakeholders
Iran:
Ankara has put pressure on its bilateral relationship with Tehran by assisting the fall of Assad, who Tehran has spent an estimated $30 billion to $50 billion supporting since 2011.
This is a significant blow for Tehran as:
the fall of Assad provided Israel the opportunity to destroy 70% to 80% of Syrian air defences. This grants Israel a safe passage through Syrian airspace to refuel its aircrafts and conduct air strikes on Iranian military and nuclear locations inside Iran - if they so wished.
Tehran loses out on influence in Syria to other Gulf state rivals who have been quick to engage with the transitional government in Syria.
Tehran’s ‘Axis of Resistance’ further fractures as key supply lines through the ‘land corridor’ connecting Iran to Hezbollah and the Mediterranean have collapsed. This also threatens Hezbollah’s chance of recovery after Israel’s near-destruction of the organisation.
Tehran, similar to Moscow, has lost credibility amongst its regional partners, such as in Yemen, raising doubts about Tehran’s capabilities.
We may even see Iran ally with the U.S. on the Kurds in northern Syria, as this is a contentious issue for Türkiye. Iran and the U.S. share a common interest in providing support and security for the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF). Tehran would do this against Ankara as their regional power dispute continues.
Russia:
Moscow's loss of Syria is an indication that it is prioritising the conflict in Ukraine.
The loss of influence in Syria also signals to other states not aligned with Western powers that Moscow may not be able to guarantee their safety - weakening the impact and image of Moscow to Russia's partners. The exporter of security has lost the influence of its primary export.
The loss of crucial military bases at Latakia (airbase) and Tartus (naval base). Tartus, in particular, is a major hit for Moscow as it was their only overseas naval installation.
Russia will re-focus its efforts on Libya and Haftar’s government - one of Libya’s two heads of state - after losing its Naval locations in the Eastern Mediterranean to ensure continued access to the Mediterranean. We can already see this taking place as Moscow transports military equipment from Syria to Libya.
Türkiye:
Ankara has won a serious battle for Syria and taken away a key position from regional rival Iran.
Ankara’s position of power regarding Damascus will also see the Western governments seeking engagement, which will cause Anakara to hold a decisive intermediary role.
Ankara will likely leverage its position to push for its domination of the East Mediterranean by starting negotiations with the new Syrian administration on possible maritime demarcation agreements, allowing Ankara and Damascus to explore oil and hydrocarbon opportunities together, strengthening its claims to gas fields in the East Mediterranean and frustrating the East Mediterranean Gas Forum’s (EMGF) relationship with Ankara.
Türkiye, as President-elect Trump recently stated, “is going to hold the key to Syria.”
Washington recently introduced bipartisan legislation, entitled “Countering Turkish Aggression Act of 2024”, on 20th December by U.S. senators, citing Ankara’s actions on Syria. This bill, according to sanctions expert Jeremy Paner, “authorizes the imposition of sanctions against Turkish government officials, as well as broad categories of transactions involving (1) the Turkish Armed Forces or the defense industry in Türkiye and (2) certain energy production in Syria.” This legislation will not assist in facilitating Ankara’s realignment with Western partners; it instead signals Washington is uneasy with Ankara’s recent movements and is an attempt to prevent attacks on their allies in the region, namely the SDF.
Opportunities & Risks
Opportunities:
Engage with the Turkish government and companies to gain exclusive access to new post-Assad Syria and partake in the reconstruction efforts - offering technical and engineering services, for example.
Due to the increased tensions between Ankara, Moscow and Tehran due to Türkiye’s securing of Syria and the ousting of Assad. The EU and US can open multilateral dialogues with Ankara and assist with Türkiye’s potential realignment with the West.
New Energy Routes - Türkiye plans to revive Syria’s oil and gas development, potentially resulting in new oil and gas pipelines linking Syria to Türkiye’s export terminals - reshaping the energy architecture of the East Mediterranean. A land-based route through Syria to Türkiye would provide a shorter and cheaper alternative to existing routes. Moreover, projects to connect Qatari gas fields to Türkiye via Saudi Arabia, Jordan, and Syria that lay dormant due to the plans being rejected by Assad, reportedly to protect Russian gas exports, could be revived. This was suggested by Ankara’s energy minister, Alparslan Bayraktar, offering an opportunity for the EU to diversify their energy imports further and make Türkiye a distribution hub (that also poses its own risks).
Risks:
Türkiye becoming the new intermediary to a post-Assad Syria provides Ankara with significant leverage with developments in Syria's future direction. If any outside power wants influence in Syria, they must go through Ankara.
Turkish reconstruction of Syria by Turkish companies and the construction of government institutions with assistance from Ankara grants Ankara long-term influence in Syria and may present challenges to others who want to influence the future of the country.
There is a possibility that civil war will ensue if HTS does not stay true to their word and build an “inclusive” government. Similar to what we saw in the early stages of the Taliban government in Afghanistan - it initially claimed to be progressive and eventually turned out regressive.
Turkish forces and allied groups (such as the SNA) have already begun to clash with Kurdish forces in the North of Syria - fighting could spiral out of control and intensive, inviting other regional players, such as Iran, to back Kurdish forces against the SNA and Turkey, which is not uncommon.
Policy recommendations
Companies engage with Turkish businesses to find business opportunities in Syria. The new government will be seeking international assistance and support, and Western states need to engage to ensure early influence and to maintain it.
Approach the new post-Assad government for investment opportunities as they seek capital and investment.
Open forums for dialogue with Ankara and the post-Assad government.
Present a portfolio of assistance and capital grants that can be offered to the post-Assad government and Turkish authorities to boost the needed development of a new Syria.
Ankara will be turning towards Western allies in the future after increased tension between Moscow and Tehran. Western policymakers now have the chance to engage with a more responsive Ankara.
With Syria opening to markets through Turkey and the Mediterranean, new energy possibilities are emerging.