Written By Tarik Ata

What is the likelihood of another Korean War?

17/01/2025 - Written by Elle McCallum

Introduction

Combat in the Korean War ceased on July 27th 1953 with the establishment of a military armistice between North and South Korea. Still, a peace treaty has yet to officially signal the conflict’s end. Over the following decades, relations between the states have remained strained, with reunification attempts and political action driving intra-peninsular destabilisation. The likelihood of a reunified Korea grows increasingly improbable as hostility between North and South Korea skyrocketed over the past year. Accordingly, the possible continuation of the Korean War re-entered geopolitical discourse concerning military and diplomatic developments. 2024 saw the fortification of North Korean forces, alongside their alliances with China and Russia. This bolstering of ties and military capacity contrasts politically troubled South Korea and its strained relationship with the United States.

Therefore, as the international system grows increasingly volatile, various geopolitical developments can be identified as potential catalysts for the escalation of conflict. Much akin to the 1950s conflict, the involvement of external actors in diffusing or exacerbating conflict on the Korean Peninsula may be the determining factor in whether the coming year sees a resurgence of outright war between North and South Korea.

Actualised Tensions 

A string of tit-for-tat exchanges on the Korean Peninsula have fuelled tensions between North and South Korea, eventually actualising the North’s destructive potential. October saw Northern allegations of Southern drones scattering propaganda in Pyongyang, an act interpreted as a provocation of “armed conflict and even war”. The North Korean reaction to these allegations reflects their increasingly aggressive rhetoric towards their neighbouring state. North Korea later actualised such sentiments by destroying roads connecting the two states, posed as an attempt to increase internal support through threat construction. In response to Northern hostility, South Korea promised to respond and signal the end of the Northern regime if needed. Antagonistic action further manifested in the Northern launch of an intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM), in violation of UN curbs, supposedly in retaliation for American and Southern accusations of deploying troops to Russia - later confirmed. More recently, South Korea’s military reported another Northern ballistic missile launch on January 6th 2025, thus extending the state’s weapon testing and cementing its offensive stance. Mutual distrust is high between the states. North Korea’s military course of action aligning with their threats effectively substantiates Southern concerns of escalating conflict, prompting one another to strike back harder.

Instability within South Korea

Following the short-lived declaration of martial law and impeachment of President Yoon Suk Yeol and subsequent acting president Han Duck Soo, South Korea is faced with uncertainty. The state faces political unrest and economic instability, appearing fragile and divided. In any context domestic disputes are suboptimal, but now hold grave potential in the face of the increasingly aggressive North Korea. The North could interpret the South’s precarity as an opportune moment to strike. South Korea has not tangibly retaliated against the North, at most blaring propaganda broadcasts across the DMZ. The lack of aggressive physical measures undertaken by the South may further contribute to perceptions of weaknesses. Beyond posing internal challenges for South Korea, the state’s domestic instability renders it an unappetising ally and diplomatic partner. Concerns surrounding the knock-on effect of South Korea’s internal turbulence on its ability to engage and deliver in foreign negotiations and dialogue. Presenting as a strong geopolitical partner is especially crucial considering South Korea’s reliance on external support, namely maintaining a positive relationship with the United States as a powerful security ally. 

The Potential Return of American Isolationism 

Heralded by isolationist intentions and plans to downsize foreign military presence, Trump's return to the White House poses strategic worries for South Korea. Once the state’s closest military ally, a possible shift towards detachment in American policy could further weaken South Korea at a pivotal point. American military presence within the South acted as a deterrent against the North and its allies. The twelfth edition of the Special Measures Agreement between the states may be on the rocks, considering Trump’s stance on defence pacts. Renegotiation of the deal appears likely as the US seeks to reduce security costs. A reduction in American military backing will increase pressure on an already-burdened South Korea whilst presenting an opportunity for North Korea and its allies to strike. Nonetheless, major policy shifts involving the Korean Peninsula may be suspended in light of US involvement in major global conflicts and, more generally, Trump’s erratic and unpredictable foreign policy approach.

Solidifying and Maintaining Northern ties

The deployment of over 10,000 North Korean soldiers in eastern Russia for military training raised concerns over the deepening ties between the two. In exchange for troops, Russia provided North Korea with access to Russian military technology and economic incentives, catalysing the domestic development of the state's nuclear and missile capabilities. Acquiring additional military prowess places North Korea in a strong strategic position, further contrasting the South’s unstable condition. It is worth noting that North Korea serves as a buffer state for Russia to prevent American advances in East Asia, much aligned with overarching Russian national interests. However, whilst the reduction in American military support of South Korea weakens the state and consequently signals an opportunity for North Korea to strike, these changes may align differentially with Russian objectives. The fluctuation in American involvement in the Korean Peninsula holds implications for North Korea’s relevance in line with Russian interests. Alternatively, China maintains a more nuanced stance. The regional power is continuing business with North Korea but is hesitant to contribute to another potential Korean War. China remains wary of the potential destabilisation of the Chinese sphere of influence and interest as a result of another regional conflict. President Xi Jinping emphasised Chinese interest in preventing conflict on the Korean Peninsula, refusing to “sit idly by when its strategic security and core interests are under threat”. Involvement in a regional conflict could hinder precocious Chinese-Western alliances and relations and add strenuous demands on a global level, on top of China’s rocky state of domestic affairs regarding Taiwan. 

Key Players and Stakeholders

  • North Korea

  • South Korea

    • Recurrently called for reunification with North Korea but promised to retaliate against Northern threats. Currently experiencing internal political disorder largely stemming from concerns regarding North Korea. 

  • The United States

  • Russia

    • The regional superpower has long-established geopolitical ties with North Korea, establishing a mutual defence pact in June 2024. More recently, Russia exchanged military technology for North Korean troops to assist with the Russo-Ukrainian war. 

  • China

    • The rising economic and military superpower maintains a triangular relationship with Russia and North Korea alongside a mutual defence pact with North Korea. 

Opportunities & Risks

Opportunities:

  • Mending relations between China and the West.

    • The surrounding tensions and foreign intervention taking stage on the Korean Peninsula are opening up the opportunity for China to tend to and mend relations with Western Europe and the United States. Taking the initiative to mitigate another Korean war could ease economic tension in the ongoing China-United States trade war. 

  • Investment in nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation processes.

    • There is a clear need for additional investment and fortification in such areas, with the presence of nuclear threat escalating alongside tensions on the Korean Peninsula.  

Risks:

  • Weakened trilateral relations in East Asia

    • The political uncertainty experienced by South Korea was mirrored in Japan, with​​ Prime Minister Shigeru Ishiba losing a majority in the October parliamentary elections. Domestic uncertainty within South Korea and Japan may undermine the alliance between the states and effectively embolden Russia and China to exert more influence within East Asia. 

  • A potential catalyst for global isolationism 

    • Trump’s potential action may trigger a trend of isolationism across the international system. Other states and members of multilateral organisations may follow suit, not only in line with American policy and action in South Korea but more generally as an adaptation to the consequent rise in defence costs. 

Conclusion

Simply put, the outbreak of conflict between North and South Korea boils down to external influence, as in the conflict’s first iteration. Another Korean War would be dependent on the alignment of conflict with the interests of the involved foreign allies, as they largely dictate Korean military capacities. The Korean Peninsular may see another war if the actualisation of threats (facilitated by foreign support and armaments) continues and escalates, Southern domestic instability endures and triggers a reduction in American support, and ties are strengthened between North Korea and Russia. 

Analogous to the 1950s conflict, North and South Korea heavily rely on external military support and the finances of foreign powers. The increase in Russian military support of North Korea and the potential reduction of American defensive influence in South Korea juxtapose the fortified and debilitated capacities of either state, tempting a Northern strike. However, the provision of military and economic support and the outbreak of war must align with the national interest of the purveyor. North and South Korea are used as pawns for the interests of hegemonic allies Russia and the United States to maintain regional influence within East Asia. The changing American stance on South Korean support may result in a reduction in Russian interest in another Korean War, rendering North Korea’s use as a buffer state redundant and postponing conflict as it no longer aligns with facilitative Russian interest. 

In the same vein, Russia and the United States, as principal allies of North and South Korea respectively, have pressing internal issues currently taking centre stage. The Russo-Ukrainian war and Trump’s upcoming inauguration may place conflict on the Korean Peninsula on the back burner but also prolong the armistice. Preoccupation with internal matters and the looming trade war with China may delay Trump’s downsizing of defence support. Meanwhile, Russia may seek to avoid further destabilisation within its sphere of influence. China is incentivised to avoid adding fuel to the fire to prevent an adverse perception in the eyes of its potential Western allies, as attempts to kindle relations that strongly oppose another Korean conflict. Avoiding further escalation on the part of major actors might be preferable to conflict as it will allow for the prioritisation of immediately pressing matters more closely aligned with national interest at a domestic level. 

Overall, foreign powers' carefully calibrated approach to conflict on the Korean Peninsula will likely constrain or catalyse the continuation of tensions between North and South Korea. The international system remains highly volatile, with the states backing North and South Korea also key players in ongoing geopolitical tensions, drawing parallels to the interventionist nature of the Cold War era. More broadly, the enabling or debilitating nature of foreign influence within the dynamic between North and South Korea highlights the interconnected character of the international system. 



Tarik Ata
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