Germany’s Long Journey to ‘Zeitenwende’
30/01/2025 - Written by Alexander Brotman
Introduction
When German Chancellor Olaf Scholz announced a ‘Zeitenwende’, or turning point, in German foreign policy shortly after Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine on 27 February 2022, it was a consequential moment for Europe, Germany, and the world. After initially only offering to send Ukraine helmets as opposed to more lethal military kit, Scholz, as head of a fragile coalition government, seemed to recognise the severity of the situation as Europe’s largest land battle since World War II was underway. In the speech, Scholz announced that Germany would significantly increase its defence spending, coming days after he stated his government would prevent the certification of the Nord Stream 2 gas pipeline from Russia. Now, close to three years later, Germany has provided or committed to roughly 37 billion euros worth of military assistance to Ukraine, and over 10,000 Ukrainian soldiers have received military training in Germany.
In the wake of his speech, it did not take long for the internal squabbles of coalition politics, fear of humiliating Russia as well as waning domestic support for Ukraine, to help change Scholz’s calculus. Some European leaders, like French President Emmanuel Macron, have evolved dramatically from saying Russia should not be humiliated to declaring Russia must not be able to win, with French forces potentially playing a role on the ground in Ukraine to help enforce the peace. With new German elections in February likely to return the Christian Democratic Union/Christian Social Union (CDU/CSU) of former chancellor Merkel to power under the leadership of Friedrich Merz, increased support to Ukraine is likely, but pro-Russia voices, as well as structural economic issues, signal continued headwinds for the incoming government.
Managing Relations
Germany has long sought to engage with Russia economically under the concept of Wandel durch Handel or ‘change through trade’, in the hope that forming close trading relations would reduce the risk of conflict and perhaps even prompt political change in Moscow. As scholar John Lough writes in his book Germany’s Russia Problem, published in 2021 prior to Moscow’s full-scale invasion, ‘a complex mixture of cultural biases, instincts, and sensitivities built up over centuries of involvement with Russia conditions the way Germans view the country and interact with it today.’ Lough also writes that ‘Germany cares about Russia’ in contrast to the US and other European allies, owing to its conflicted identity as to how it can be a European nation, as well as its shared pariah status in Europe during various points of the last century. Germany, in addition to other NATO member states, has only begun to care about Ukraine and view the nation on its own terms and with a unique history and identity divorced from Russia.
For its part, the EU also embraced elements of Germany’s approach as a core tenet of globalisation, with change through trade viewed as an immovable fact of international politics in the first decades of the twentieth century. Shortly after Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, however, European Economic Commissioner Paolo Gentiloni declared that the conflict proved the policy of seeking change through trade was no longer possible. By the time of Putin’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in the wake of the COVID-19 pandemic and other challenges, the gates of globalisation were closing to give way to economic nationalism and regionalism, de-risking as opposed to the pursuit of unfettered access to new markets.
Under Scholz’s predecessor, Chancellor Merkel, the Germany – Russia relationship was severely tested but survived Putin’s annexation of Crimea, military engagements in the Donbas, and other destructive measures largely intact. This was to the notable opposition of Washington and other EU and NATO member states who viewed the Nord Stream pipelines and Berlin’s dependency on Russia for energy as a critical vulnerability. Furthermore, German and Russian industry remained closely intertwined, perhaps best exemplified by former chancellor Gerhard Schroeder working for several Russian state-owned companies including Gazprom, Rosneft, and Nord Stream AG, the pipeline’s operating consortium. Now, with the growing realisation that Russia’s economic interests are not compatible with those of Berlin or Brussels, the days of Wandel durch Handel are clearly over. Former German defence minister and current European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen echoed this during her recent speech at the World Economic Forum in Davos. Von der Leyen claimed that ‘those days are gone’, when the EU, and by extension Germany, could ‘rely on the rising tide of global trade to drive its growth.’ Thus, a mix of economic reality as well as the increasingly influential views of other NATO member states like Poland and the Baltic nations have helped to cement this shift.
Expanding Military Support
Like most of Ukraine’s military backers in the NATO alliance, Germany’s military support has expanded one piece of hardware at a time, largely in response to what Washington has been able to provide, and in carefully weighing the risks of escalation with Russia. The debate over providing Ukraine with German Leopard tanks went on for months, with Berlin engaging in contentious discussions with other NATO allies over whether they could sell their own supplies of Leopards to Ukraine. Now, after Washington, London, and Paris have allowed Kyiv to use ATACMS, Storm Shadow, and SCALP cruise missiles, respectively, for targeted strikes inside Russia, the latest debate is over Germany providing Ukraine with its own Taurus missiles. Merz has spoken in favour of providing Taurus missiles to Kyiv, downplaying the risks of escalation with Russia. According to a poll conducted in November for ARD TV, however, over 60 percent of Germans are against the provision of Taurus missiles to Ukraine.
Much will depend on what happens on the battlefield in Ukraine in the coming months, and whether President Trump is able to meet and secure any deal with President Putin and President Zelensky. What is more likely are continued defence agreements and investments by German defence companies like Rheinmetall to manufacture within Ukraine and enhance supply lines of critical armaments. Germany will continue to play an important role in providing humanitarian and economic assistance to Ukraine, but absent a major shift, the provision of German military hardware on the battlefield is unlikely to be a determining factor in shaping conditions on the ground.
The Coming Election
At stake in the coming election in February is whether Germany can fully commit to Zeitenwende as an organising principle of collective defence and security, or whether it represents a passing political fad unable to overcome domestic headwinds. According to the IMF, the German economy is expected to be the worst-performing of the G7 nations in 2025 with minimal GDP growth that has consistently been downgraded in IMF forecasts. This has placed pressure on German aid to Ukraine, with Scholz warning of the current 3 billion euro aid package that pensions or local government funding may need to be cut if it passes. This situation is not unique to Germany, however, as governments across Europe are questioning the sustainability of military aid to Ukraine against addressing the economic needs of their own citizens.
Furthermore, since Russia’s full-scale invasion, Scholz has worked with President Biden, arguably the last transatlanticist American president whose views of Russia and NATO were shaped by the post-World War II international order and the events of the Cold War. Germany’s next chancellor will work with President Trump, who has questioned the legitimacy and the role of NATO and whether the US should come to the aid of its NATO allies who fail to pay their fair share towards collective defence. Trump’s recent request that NATO allies commit to spending 5% of their GDP on defence is likely to further strain relations with Germany, although it will be welcome news to the alliance’s eastern flank members who have already committed to that goal.
Trump had a fractious relationship with Germany during his first term in office and it is likely to be acrimonious once more, owing to Germany’s low defence spending, poor performing economy, and close economic links with China. Trump has the upper hand in the relationship, but for Merz, this is a moment of clarity and greater predictability that Trump’s first election could not provide.
Merz would be the next chancellor from the CDU after Merkel, but he is quickly distancing himself from some of Merkel’s more controversial policies that have played a role in lifting support for the far-right Alternative for Germany (AfD) party. The AfD is currently polling in second place at 21% after the CDU at 30%, and Merz will battle to keep CDU members from moving to the AfD. Given Germany’s political structure, however, the AfD is likely to be excluded from any governing coalition at the national level, and the CDU is more likely to form a government with Scholz’s Social Democrats or another left-leaning party. In the campaign, the more mainstream parties of the CDU/CSU and Social Democrats may modify their language to help appeal to AfD voters, something Scholz’s opponents have accused him of doing.
Opportunities and Risks
In the upcoming election, Germany has the opportunity to change course and fully commit to the defence of Ukraine as well as European security by acting as a leading partner in NATO. This opportunity is more likely to come to fruition under a CDU/CSU-led government under Merz rather than a continuation of Social Democrat rule. For Germany, as well as many other NATO and EU member states, the dual risks of abandoning Ukraine vs. escalating the conflict with Russia weigh heavily on the minds of their political leaders. The greatest optimism comes from the stark cross-party realisation that the days of economic co-habitation or ‘change through trade’ with Moscow are a relic of another era. Any attempt to revert back to this policy would likely harm Germany’s image in the EU and NATO at a time when French President Macron, Polish President Tusk, and even Italian Prime Minister Meloni are more closely aligned in their approach to Russia.
As the election nears, Merz is playing the role of the pragmatist, being realistic about the issues facing Germany and the role of German power while establishing constraints on a system that has buckled under a decade of pressure. There is the risk of waning public support for Ukraine across the EU hijacking the agenda, but also the opportunity with Trump back in office to reframe support as a values-driven imperative to establish Europe as a principled, sovereign actor on the world stage.
Policy Considerations
With Poland, the Baltic states, and a growing number of Western European NATO member states signalling a desire to increase defence spending to 3-4% of GDP, Berlin under the next government will be pressured to follow suit. Lithuania, where the German-led enhanced forward presence battlegroup is stationed, recently committed to spending 5-6% of its GDP on defence, something President Trump is urging all NATO allies to adopt.
In addition to the policy considerations of supplying Kyiv with Taurus missiles and increasing other military aid to Ukraine, domestic considerations like the future of Germany’s debt brake will play a direct role in the level of Berlin’s support to Kyiv. Long seen as a measure of fiscal prudence that served Germany well during the eurozone crisis and established Berlin as a creditor state within the EU, it is now more of a hindrance to growth and innovation. The next government will have to make hard and at times unpopular decisions over how to reinvigorate the German economy, and whether that economy should be closer to the war-footing of Poland, the Baltic states, and even Russia, albeit with an alternate agenda. Germany has come to play a leading role in a Europe at peace, but for Berlin’s neighbours from Warsaw to Prague and Kyiv, Europe is once again in a state of conflict. Germany’s next chancellor will have to balance the pressing domestic needs of German citizens with the more forceful external engagement that Berlin has long shied away from but which its neighbours and allies are imploring it to accept in a changing Europe.