The Mekong River Basin and transnational environmental management between China and Southeast Asia
29/01/2025 - Written by Amriza B. Batubara
Introduction
Under the amplifying effect of global climate change, a series of intertwined environmental challenges in the Mekong River region have become more urgent and critical.
The Mekong River Basin's average daily temperature has risen from 0.5°C to 1.5°C over the past 50 years and is projected to continue to rise by 0.79°C over the next 20 years. In addition to higher temperatures, climate change is leading to anomalies in precipitation patterns. Longer durations and more intense precipitation are frequent in Southeast Asia, and these trends will intensify in the future.
More importantly, the headwaters of the Mekong River originate in China. Its strategic location gives China the upper hand and stakes in controlling water management for over 30 million people downstream in Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos, whose livelihoods depend on the river.
This raises several geopolitical concerns, whereby the Mekong River Commission (MRC) was set up at the behest of ASEAN +3 - an extension and forum of Southeast Asia that includes China in annual policy dialogues. To date, the MRC has stood for over 13 years, with much proliferation on public facilities such as transport and trade produced as a result.
The by-product of climate change and water makes a unique bargaining token
To date, China has amassed the building of at least 13 dams and hydropower stations on the Mekong, despite only hosting less than half of the river. Its mountainous geography brings the advantage of water supply via reservoirs at the expense of middle and lower Mekong, where farmers have historically depended on its rich loess for fertile soil, especially in its delta area, home to major urban areas such as Ho Chi Minh City and Can Tho.
By intersecting climate change creating drier conditions in the Himalayas and, therefore lesser water flow capacity, along with pre-extant borders, China has found itself in a powerful position in controlling the water supply of nations not sovereign to them. With every new hydropower facility, drought risk increasingly heightens as farmers depend more on China’s Belt and Road Initiative.
Contextual analysis
Dam development in the Mekong and Lancang rivers began nearly 60 years ago in the 1960s. Initially well distributed between member states, the rise of middle-class China sprouted the capitalisation of every inch of their soil, including the otherwise sparsely populated Himalayas.
Towards the 2000s, river valleys in the Yunnan province were flooded to accommodate China’s skyrocketing urbanisation, much to the cost of its southerly neighbours, epitomised in repeated droughts that were incredibly severe and struck crops in 2016.
As a result of its heavy dependence on the Mekong, several states essentially became a playground for Chinese investment in return for water security. Laos, in particular, has seen a proliferation of Chinese influence as a newfound anchor for deeper Asian connectivity, with the expansion of its (high speed) rail connecting its capital, Vientiane, with China through Boten opened in 2022, as well as votes highly in favour of Chinese foreign policy incentives in the UN forum prominent from the 2020s onwards. The Mekong River has, therefore, become an outlet for China’s developmental arm.
Key players & Stakeholders
China - A regional giant, China acts as an eminent entity that reigns in control around its neighbours. In the south, China hosts the sources of many key rivers to Asian civilisations, including the Brahmaputra and Mekong rivers - leaving other sovereigns (predominantly agrarian societies) at its mercy for nourishment.
Laos - Southeast Asia’s only landlocked power is a close ally of China and is heavily dependent on the Mekong River. Given its proximity to China, Laos has become a guinea pig to trial Chinese innovation and China-sponsored Asian connectivity. Coincidentally, they are a unitary party communist state like their northern neighbours too.
Cambodia - The second-most reliant state on China is a small coastal country sandwiched between Vietnam, Laos, and Thailand. Cambodia is a democracy that only recently came out of the genocidal dictatorship of Pol Pot fifty years ago. Today, it is a middle power with a strong stance on neutrality in foreign affairs - leading to suspicions of the nation being receptive to Chinese encroachments, mainly through the diasporic “Bamboo Network”.
Vietnam - A neighbour to China yet adversarial, Vietnam is a rapidly growing state, with its GDP growth the fastest amongst ASEAN consistently since 2021, and consistently heralded an industrialising nation post-COVID. Recently, it has beefed up security by increasing its security budget and allying with the US in a joint defence budget after further “violations” of its South China Sea waters and its claims on the Spratly Islands.
ASEAN - As an institution, ASEAN has been instrumental in platforming the development of discourses around the water and preventing water wars akin to the Great Lakes region of Sub-Saharan Africa.
Military, economic and social dimensions
Military: Existing tensions in SCS will be in mind when policy discussions come into force. China’s provocations against Southeast Asian environmental issues have prompted military action, most notoriously the pouring of sands and concretes in robust yet febrile coral environments in the Spratly and Paracel Islands.
While relatively more landlocked, we may see this conundrum transpire into a Siachen Glacier-like situation, whereby borders are heavily guarded and consequentially bring about skirmishes.
Nonetheless, China hosting shared rivers means it has become more careful and tactical in securitising them. It has only recently become more mindful of water availability and its ability to be politicised for favours. If anything, it is believed that the Mekong River can press for resolutions to previously insurmountable issues in Southeast Asia. That said, the Mekong River had thus become one of the few rare stories whereby neighbourhood diplomacy has resulted in demilitarisation instead of escalation.
Economic: Constant sedimentation of minerals, accumulation and subsequent sand mining has taken a toll on the local soil cover, threatening the river’s seasonal movements (especially downstream near the Tonle Sap Lake) and depleting fish stocks.
This environmental catastrophe, however, has been averted with new economic pacts signed to boost US$2.6 million for over 10 projects in mainly agriculture, water resources management and environmental protection, as a means of countering the effect - a red herring, if you will, from the accumulating environmental toll the heavy alteration of the terrain is taking on the lowlands. This comes as part of the Mekong-Lancang Cooperation (MLC) initiative that acts as an extension of the extant MRC.
Social: Education and empowerment incentives are aplenty with the rise of advocacy on primary sectors here and the need to know concern on depletion. As environmental damages have become cause for concern, and indeed a watershed moment for preservation, special institutions designed for industry workers to enhance natural resource management has existed since at least 2015.
Furthermore, the MRC has fostered a tourism culture by launching Education and Visitor Centres. Whether they have successfully garnered tourist dollars is a matter for another story. However, it has become clear that the capitalisation of the river in this regard is, among many other spots, through the infamous Golden Triangle area today - the tripoint between Thailand, Laos, and Vietnam, and a region historically known for its opium and illicit trades - along with Luang Prabang, Vientiane and Ho Chi Minh City.
Opportunities and Risks
Opportunities:
Massive room for development incentives in a lucrative region.
Southeast Asia is a fast growing region, and to bandwagon with the MRC could lead to trade previously inaccessible to further inland locations such as Laos. Its proximity to a great power makes it a petri dish to provide strategic roadmaps, forums and incentives such as the EU Strategy of the Danube Region (EUSDR, 2023). Adopting this approach will further ASEAN’s objective to optimise trade flows in the region towards 2030 (ASEC, 2015).
Innovation proliferation in spillover of middle class markets.
Vietnam is a fast-growing power, with an upward of 10% in its economic growth per annum in GDP terms; Cambodia hosts some of the largest ports in the region such as Sihanoukville. But with increased capacity-building in previous economic vacuums such as Laos, new ports can be built in the South where the sea is closer, and manufacturing hubs similar to that of Vietnam’s chip and textile sector to Laps may spillover Southeast Asia’s already ballooning middle class sector.
More job opportunities mean more education properties - globalisation linkages.
If all is to remain well with water management, the nutrient-rich waters of the Mekong could feed into the new livelihoods of port workers, fishermen, and farmers, before eventually getting into factory workers, manufacturers, R&D researchers and scientists. With the rise of jobs, rise of life satisfaction and quality, there will be more demand for better services that to date remains missing in the region.
Risks:
Descending to authoritarianism in China will bring along puppet states.
As worries of China becoming more authoritarian and Xi Jinping’s presidency of a lifetime, it may bring along Laos and Cambodia, given their high sponsorship. China can weaponise water to its favour - though ASEAN will likely quickly sanction said “rogue” states, much like their rightful attitude to Myanmar post-coup d’etat in 2021 onwards.
Weaponisation of water persists and famine occurs.
If buddy diplomacy falls through and the worst-case scenario was to rise, droughts may turn to famine. In this case, ASEAN will likely provide limited water aid to especially Laos in this scenario.
Dialogues may have to remain bilateral and, therefore cumbersome.
The lack of a backbone in ASEAN and the MRC institutionalising may pose logistical difficulties in making a ”water security for all” narrative sail, and investment may, therefore, have to be processed individually per state, especially given the multilateral-to-monolateral dynamic posed. A contingency plan of deepening the institutionalisation of the MRC through comprehensive trade agreements and framework-building could be done, but will take years and resources to reach - a wait that cannot match up with the region’s rapid industrialisation.
Conclusion
The Mekong River basin has caused a proliferation of perhaps needed yet inert transnational groupings between China and its southerly neighbours. This signalled an era of environmental commitments that crossed beyond political lines for its diplomatic self-interest. Had it not been for the Belt and Road Initiative, this watershed moment would have been mired by an uncooperative pariah state, shunned by the world for its hawkish despotic regime and poor human rights track record. However, due to their proximity, mutual non-interventionism principle, and Southeast Asia's creating demand, states can conduct business with China for a common interest.
Its environmental management, while minimal due to the need for industrialisation, is new yet inspirational to Southeast Asia and is likely to be an impetus to future collaborations between China and its partners and leave a lasting impression on ASEAN.
However, behind the veil of cooperativeness, stakeholders must not be blindsided by the subsequent commercialisation of water and agriculture without comprehensive deals - one which will take a hit to the global green energy market as biomass deteriorates and water flow is reduced below China.