Implications of HTS’s Political Realignment for the Turkistan Islamic Party’s Separatist Strategies and China’s Counter-Terrorism Policy
25/01/2025 - Written by Edward Wilson
Introduction
In December 2024, a rebel coalition led by Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) sent shockwaves across the globe by toppling Bashar al-Assad’s seemingly unshakable regime in Syria, marking the end of the Assad dynasty’s five-decade rule. This seismic conclusion to Syria’s brutal civil war, which has seen casualties upwards of 480,000 and displaced up to 12 million people, was facilitated by a myriad of external factors. The diversion of Russia’s military resources to the Ukraine conflict crippled the de facto air force supplied to Assad, whilst Moscow’s preoccupation with the conflict disrupted the flow of critical Russian intelligence. Meanwhile, escalating conflict with Israel had left Hezbollah, the backbone of Assad’s on-the-ground defensive forces, increasingly overstretched. With allies vital to Assad’s survival weakened and distracted, this presented a newly formed coalition of opposition forces, stationed in the northwestern province of Idlib, an opportunistic moment to mount an offensive.
Among the factions involved in the sweeping 11-day offensive were Uyghur militants from the Turkistan Islamic Party (TIP) – a Turkic-speaking and largely Muslim ethnic group established in the 1990s, fighting for separatism in China’s Xinjiang region. The continued involvement of Uyghur militants in Syria raises salient questions about the intersection of global jihadist networks, diverging separatist aims, and international counter-terrorism policies, particularly considering HTS’s efforts to distance itself from its extremist origins on the global stage.
In an interview following the capture of Damascus, a TIP member vowed that this was only the beginning of the movement, stating that in the future, “we will chase the Chinese infidels off our land”. Many experts question the TIP’s operational capacity to pose a significant domestic threat in China; however, the symbolic rhetoric underscores the long-term transnational ambitions of the growing diasporic network in its Syrian branch.
The implications for the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) counter-terrorism policies moving forward will undoubtedly be significant, as Beijing must now contend with an increasingly established transnational network of Uyghur separatist factions. However, in their pursuit of legitimacy and efforts to build diplomatic relations, HTS, despite providing TIP militants a safe haven, has reportedly instructed the organisation to comply with its broader diplomatic efforts by ensuring Syria does not become a base for launching future attacks that transcend its borders. In examining these intricate and fragile developments, this report analyses the influence of HTS’s political realignment on the TIP’s separatist goals and the implications for the CCP’s counter-terrorism strategy.
The integration of Uyghurs militants into Syria’s Rebel Coalition
The involvement of Uyghur militants in the Syrian conflict reflects the complex mosaic of global jihadist networks, the influence of external state actors with diverging regional aims, and commonalities in aspirations for autonomy and self-determination.
The TIP is predominantly composed of Uyghurs Muslims – an ethnic minority native to Xinjiang who oppose Beijing’s governance in the region, viewing it as an illegitimate occupation. With the objective of establishing an independent state in ‘East Turkestan’ - a region encompassing Xinjiang and parts of Central Asia, the network historically engaged in insurgent-style guerrilla warfare, including attacks on military installations and suicide bombings. This modus operandi is legitimised by many TIP militants, as a method of countering the reported, repressive policies enacted against Uyghur populations by the CCP - including mass detention in ‘re-education centres’, forced labour, invasive surveillance and cultural suppression. However, Beijing, contesting the claims of Uyghur marginalisation as baseless, maintains that its regional policies are purely designed for counter-extremism, economic development, and stability purposes.
Following its establishment and harsh government crackdowns, many TIP members fled with their families to the tribal regions in Pakistan and Taliban-controlled Afghanistan, where they developed close connections with the Taliban and al-Qaeda. Not only were these connections facilitated by shared ideologies but also through the Taliban’s long-held efforts to protect Muslims from extradition to non-Muslim nations (including China).
The Syrian conflict in 2011 caused many Uyghur fighters to migrate with their families from these tribal strongholds in Pakistan and Afghanistan and from Xinjiang, settling in the northern Idlib province. Reports suggest that Turkish intelligence partially facilitated this Uyghur resettlement as a method of altering the province's ethnic composition. This demographic shift supported Turkey’s regional aims by introducing populations loyal to Turkish-supported proxies, thus providing a direct challenge to Assad’s forces whilst mitigating the influence of Kurdish opposition near their borders.
Furthermore, by protecting communities with Pan-Turkic solidarity, Turkey portrayed itself as a guardian figure for marginalised Uyghur Muslims whilst indirectly pressuring China over the reported controversial policies in Xinjiang - aiding the pragmatic use of Pan-Turkist ideology espoused by President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan.
By 2016, it was estimated that 4,000–5,000 Uyghurs had relocated, predominantly settling in the homes of Alawites who fled due to fears of sectarian persecution. This move facilitated the TIP’s transnational connections to jihadist factions where many Uyghur militants were drafted into groups like Jabhat al-Nusra - the al-Qaeda affiliate in Syria, and Daesh - more commonly known as The Islamic State, ISIS or ISIL.
Rebranding Resistance: HTS’s bid for legitimacy
For years, Abu Mohammed al-Jolani, the leader of HTS (a proscribed terror group by the U.S. and various other nations), has fought to position himself as a legitimate alternative to Assad’s brutal rule, characterised by draconian measures - often disproportionately directed against Sunni populations, and a sprawling security apparatus, deeply entrenched across all aspects of governance.
Seeking to transform the global perception of HTS from an organisation marked by ideological zealotry into a credible political force capable of governing post-Assad Syria, al-Jolani cut previous ties with al-Qaeda and dissolved Jabhat al-Nusra in 2016, bringing together other factions under the rebranded name Hay’at Tahrir al-Shams (Organisation for the Liberation of the Levant). Central to this political realignment has been al-Jolani’s ‘purge’ of foreign jihadist fighters from the Syrian ranks as a method of removing Salafi jihadism as the organisation’s overarching ideology.
Instead, al-Jolani has emphasised ‘Syrianising’ HTS, showcasing his bid to align closer ideologically to a national liberation movement. These statements, although potentially reflective of broader long-term goals, are questionable in practice, given the continued presence of foreign fighters like those within the TIP. This rhetoric is not new, however. In 2021, al-Jolani declared, “We are fighting the Assad regime, and we do not pose any danger to Europe or America.”, emphasising al-Jolanis’s attempts to transition away from the practice of weaponising Takfir synonymous with Salafi jihadism (enacting violence against non-believers or kafirs).
To further HTS’s commitment to moderation, al-Jolani has also publicly insisted that Syria “cannot be run by the mentality of groups and militias,” promoting a vision of HTS as a unifying government authority seeking stability after years of devastating conflict. Given al-Jolani’s direct links with and involvement in establishing terror networks, this commitment is shrouded in doubt.
The insurgent activities of Jabhat al-Nusra, including the sustained suicide bombing campaigns of 2012-2015, further tarnish al-Jolani’s claims of moderation. However, some analysts argue that HTS has already succeeded in establishing administrative structures in Idlib, highlighting a degree of stability.
Syria’s deeply fragmented landscape carved along ethno-sectarian lines - including Sunni and Shia Muslims, Alawites, Druze, Syrian Kurds, Assyrian Christians, Turkmen, and smaller minorities such as Circassians and Armenians, further complicate this fragile transition period. HTS is primarily comprised of Sunni Muslims from the Northern regions of Syria - communities who experienced unspeakable brutality at the hands of Assad’s government, who were accused of numerous war crimes, including indiscriminate bombing, the use of chemical weapons, siege warfare and starvation in the region.
Whether enough time has passed for all the members within this group to de-radicalise - many of whom have been left traumatised by the atrocities of the civil war - remains questionable, and fears amongst ethnic and religious minorities of future marginalisation remains genuine.
Ultimately, HTS’s ability to stabilise Syria’s internal divisions and deliver on promises for a united governance will depend on its ability to navigate these fragile tensions in the post-Assad future. Such a task will only be hindered by the lingering presence of external actors still invested in the region, many of which have diverging geopolitical aims, such as the U.S.-backed, predominantly Kurdish Syrian Democratic Forces stationed East of the Euphrates and the direct territorial challenges posed by Turkish-backed proxies.
Non-state actors closely associated with HTS will also determine al-Jolani’s ability to sway both domestic and global opinions. For instance, following the overthrow of Assad, Abdul Haq al-Turkistani, the TIP leader, released a statement remarking that “The Chinese disbelievers will soon taste the same torment that the disbelievers in the Levant have tasted, if God wills,” echoing the dangerous takfiri and sectarian rhetoric that HTS has been attempting to distance itself from. With the TIP freshly emboldened by a victory that radical members deem to be divinely inspired, the question remains: how effective will HTS’s political realignment efforts be amongst the extended coalition forces? And what does this victory mean for the CCP’s domestic counter terrorism policies?
Implications for TIP separatism and China’s counter terrorism approach in Xinjiang
Formerly, the TIP fought under the black banner historically flown by Muslim armies (al-raya), that had more recently been appropriated by Daesh and other Salafi Jihadist factions. However, in alignment with HTS’s top-down efforts to rebrand as a nationalist movement, the TIP has adopted a blue flag representing East Turkestan, which was seen flying after the fall of Aleppo. While according to Uyghur activists, this de-radicalisation of the group's image has garnered increasing support in the Xinjiang region, resonating with the local secular Uyghur populaces, it is unlikely to influence Beijing’s stance on the TIP threat.
Underscoring the CCP’s indifference to the TIP’s symbolic displays and the likelihood of diplomacy in the near future, was the response of Liu Pengyu - a spokesperson for the Chinese Foreign Ministry - to the rebel coalition's victory. Emphasising his concern regarding the TIP’s global collusion with terrorist networks to plot attacks against overseas Chinese targets, he concluded that the network poses a "grave threat" to China's interests and national security. Liu affirmed the CCP’s proactive approach to increase cooperation with the international community in counter-terrorism operations against the TIP, emphasising it as a “core concern” for the nation.
The TIP’s involvement in offensives that captured strategic Russian strongholds, including Latakia and Tartus, demonstrates their advanced operational capabilities. While these achievements are notable, the TIP’s diasporic network in Syria remains dwarfed by China’s military capabilities and its vast intelligence apparatus, leading experts to question their capacity to pose a substantial threat. Still, following their victories, the network has disseminated propaganda across their Syrian media outlets, depicting their battle-hardened legions, advanced weaponry, and military logistics, amplifying worries in Beijing and beyond. Militants from within the group have also shared videos addressing their grievances with the CCP’s mistreatment of Uyghurs in Xinjiang, threatening to utilise munitions seized from Assad’s Syrian Army in future attacks in China.
On the Syrian front, China is expected to push for disarmament and extradition of the TIP members involved in the Syrian uprising, an effort further complicated by al-Jolani’s commitment to protecting its fighters involved in the insurgency and his recent appointment of Uyghur Commander Abdulaziz Dawood Khudaberdi, as brigadier-general. Syria’s new government, desperate to establish diplomatic relations and crippled by sanctions, will likely want to please China. However, al-Jolani has consistently ensured external observers that the TIP does not pose a threat to the outside world and will be welcome in Syria, so long as they abide by their prior agreements with HTS. The Syrian government’s effectiveness in reigning in TIP activity will ultimately determine the evolution of its relationship with Beijing and the broader implications for China’s counter-terrorism efforts.
Domestically, Beijing is expected to increase surveillance in Xinjiang, with critics arguing that the CCP will utilise the TIP’s activities in Syria as a pretext for systemic repression of Uyghur populations. Mitigating the Uyghur threat in Xinjiang will remain a priority for the CCP, as a method of safeguarding their overseas investments under the Belt and Road Initiative. Xinjiang is critical to the CCP’s economic strategy, as the region serves as a channel to Pakistan and Central Asia, positioning separatist activity in the region as a direct threat to its national interests. This will undoubtedly be met with increasing anti-government sentiment that has the potential to galvanise the next generation of Uyghur separatists.
Opportunities & Risks
Opportunities:
Diplomatic Normalisation.
The CCP has already expressed interest in conducting collaborative multinational counter-terrorism initiatives to mitigate what they view as the TIP threat. Should cooperation with China proceed, Syria will have a significant opportunity to foster diplomatic relations and work towards normalisation on the international stage. Such a move would also help the nation attain vital economic relief needed to help rebuild the country.
Risks:
Coalition fractures and infighting.
China’s push for extradition of TIP fighters in Syria will be a salient issue moving forward for Syria’s internal security dynamics. Suppose the new Syrian authorities are pressured into extraditing insurgents like the TIP militants. In that case, this has the potential to spark backlash amongst factions in the coalitions with lingering extremist sentiment - many of whom would view such actions as a violation of their Salafi Jihadist interpretation of the Islamic principles to defend Muslims (jihad al-dafaa). Thus, the risk of HTS’s coalition splintering and clashing with one another remains substantial.
Limiting diplomacy in the region.
Syria’s willingness to extradite foreign fighters with external regional ties could impact its chances to foster relations with key regional actors in the region. Relations with Turkey, for example, who have strong ties to the Uyghur movement and whose criticism of China’s Xinjiang policies affords them geopolitical leverage, will likely be strained should extradition go ahead. However, this may also become a litmus test on the Uyghur movement for Ankara, which may not want to give up its increasingly close relationship with China and its newfound political power in Syria in support of the Uyghur movement.
Conclusion
In the coming months, the new Syrian authority and its visions for post-Assad Syria will face substantial internal and global challenges. Ensuring lasting peace in the region and preventing Syria from becoming a staging area for terrorism during this fragile transition will require massive diplomatic support from the wider international community.
In return, Syria is expected to comply with international humanitarian law, continue its political realignment efforts, and work to ensure equal representation in the new government to minimise lingering ethno-sectarian divisions. Alleviating the anxieties of external observers like China necessitates al-Jolani’s government to ensure its security guarantees, such as preventing the TIP and other factions from using Syria as a temporary training ground. Cooperation with regional actors like Turkey and Qatar can support this effort by preventing the local militias, funded and armed by the US, from exploiting sectarian tensions or the current security vacuum in the region.
Ultimately, so long as TIP grievances with Uyghur mistreatment in Xinjiang persist, so will tensions with Beijing. While a doubtful outcome, advocating for international oversight in Xinjiang to ensure that the CCP’s counter-terrorism initiatives do not violate international humanitarian laws could progress de-radicalisation efforts and open avenues for diplomacy.
As the post-Assad Syrian future continues to unfold, these complex dynamics will continue to evolve, and only time will tell if the TIP is genuinely aligned with HTS’s visions for Syria and beyond. Provided that the network maintains a strong military presence in Syria, Beijing will no doubt be steadfast in its domestic responses and will continue to mount pressure on Syria’s newly formed institutions for extradition and disarmament - policies that could have grave consequences for regional stability.